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JUSTIN SIMARD†
INTRODUCTION 
Despite well-documented struggles encountered during 
the recent economic downturn, American lawyers maintain
a dominant presence in American life.1 There are more 
lawyers in the United States than in any other country in the
world.2 This continuing economic dominance has roots more 
than two centuries old. This Article shows that lawyers
helped lay the foundation for capitalism in the early
Republic. At a time when both federal and state governments
held little power, lawyers stepped in to fill the gap. Private
lawyers served basic economic roles: they established legal
institutions and markets on the frontier, generated liquidity
before the federal government printed money, and provided
† Fellow, Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy. I would like to thank the
University of Pennsylvania, the Cromwell Foundation, the Library Company of
Philadelphia, and the Baldy Center for research support. Many thanks to Greg
Ablavsky, Anya Bernstein, Guyora Binder, Smita Ghosh, Sarah Barringer
Gordon, Michael Halberstam, David Hausman, Fred Konefsky, Sophia Lee,
Camilo Arturo Leslie, Walter Licht, Serena Mayeri, Sara Mayeux, Errol
Meidinger, David Moss, John Henry Schlegel, Matt Steilen, Rob Steinfeld, Emma
Teitelman, Tamara Thornton, Sarah Winsberg, and Mike Zuckerman for
comments and criticism. Thanks also to Matthew Eaves and the editors of the
Buffalo Law Review for their careful editing.
1. See Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal
Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 527–28 (2013) (concluding that
profession’s response to the economic crisis illustrates its strength).
2. Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let’s Kill All the Economists: An
Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and
Political System, 70 TEX. L. REV. 645, 646 (1992) (discussing statistics on number
of lawyers in U.S.); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparing Legal Professions Cross-
Nationally: From a Professions-Centered to a State-Centered Approach, 11 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 415, 418 (1986). 
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1060 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
the security that their clients needed to participate in
volatile national markets. The profession grew alongside
capitalism, and it built a culture and developed institutions,
such as law firms, that solidified the connection between
lawyers and commerce. These lawyers formed the basis of
the modern profession and the modern American economy.
These findings are new. Although the political
importance of lawyers in the early Republic is well-known,
the role of private lawyers in building capitalism has been
mostly undocumented. Part of this oversight stems from an
unjustified emphasis on lawyers’ work in court. It is
relatively easy to find out what lawyers said in briefs and
what judges said in opinions; it is harder to reconstruct what
legal practice actually looked like in 1800. This Article
exploits a new set of sources—legal account books—that,
along with the correspondence of lawyers and other
materials, paint a detailed, day-to-day portrait of legal
practice in the early nineteenth century. In these books, 
lawyers recorded information about their clients, their work,
and their fees. They are especially revealing because they
were designed to be used day in and day out; they were not
presented and curated for posterity. They are valuable, in
other words, because they show what lawyers did, not what
they said they did.
These candid sources reveal that the American legal
profession drove commerce at the birth of the Republic.
Lawyers created early American monetary policy, alleviating
a liquidity crisis by writing and enforcing promissory notes;
expanded eastern markets by enforcing property rights as
land agents on the frontier; enriched clients in New York
City by building trust in a volatile market; and knit together
the northern and southern economies with long-distance
debt collection services.3 In short, the routine work of 
3. My current research analyzes all of these economic interventions, but the
profession’s work on the frontier and New York City will be the focus of this
Article. 
    
 
   
    
   
 
    
    
   
   
  
   
  
    
    
  
  
    
     
  
  
   
    
    
  
     
      
     
 
          
     
      
     
 
         
      
          
         
    
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1061
lawyers was integral to the development of American 
capitalism. Their presence was vital during the nineteenth
century, helping create conditions for economic growth that
economist Douglass North has identified as relatively rare in
world history.4 
This Article uses two case studies. The first, an analysis
of lawyers’ work on the western frontier demonstrates that
lawyers played essential roles in the construction and
expansion of a modern economic framework. The second, a
study of lawyers in New York City, shows that the profession 
remained crucial to the functioning of an American capitalist
economy, even after that framework was well established. 
Nineteenth-century American lawyers not only built the
American economy but also ensured themselves (and their
successors) a place in it. Lawyers embraced the routine 
commercial work that allowed the nascent market to 
function. In the early nineteenth century, private law work
was a fact of life; fifty years later, it was a calling. That
calling still motivates lawyers today.
This Article tells the story of how American lawyers built
the system that necessitates their participation. It therefore
not only contributes to an understanding of the birth of
modern American capitalism but also to a broader literature
on the role of lawyers in economic life. First, it shows that
lawyers accomplished far more than standard economic
accounts of their work acknowledge: they not only managed
transactions, but supplied basic structures required for the
economy to function. Second, it illustrates the role lawyers 
played in the early Republic in providing the formal and
informal constraints that institutional economists and
economic historians believe are essential to economic growth.
Third, this Article builds on and extends the work of scholars
4. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 8–9 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990). North, however,
does not idealize the nineteenth-century American economy as other less
nuanced thinkers do. He acknowledges that it was “admixed with some adverse
consequences” for its participants. Id. at 9.
   
       
       
   
     
  
   
  
     
   
 
 
      
       
   
    
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
   
     
     
   
     
  
  
   
     
  
   
    
   
    
1062 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
of the legal profession, showing that such day-to-day study of
lawyers’ work is fruitful for historians and revealing that the
powerful role of lawyers in American life is not a recent
phenomenon brought on by the rise of regulation and the
administrative state. Finally, this Article contributes to 
debates about the causes of long-term economic
development, showing that private lawyers can provide the 
institutions that, according to many political economists,
explain why some countries are richer than others. A better
understanding of this role helps explain the continuing
importance of lawyers to the American economy.
This Article begins in Part I by analyzing the scholarly
literature on the role of lawyers in American economic life. It
finds—after reviewing literature from economists, legal
scholars, historians, and others—that scholars tend to
underestimate the importance of the legal profession. Close
historical study of the profession is necessary to show its
central role in the development of capitalism. Part II begins
this close study. Using legal account books and
correspondence, this Part examines the day-to-day practice 
of legal work on the Ohio frontier in the early nineteenth
century. These sources illustrate that by working as agents
of eastern businessmen, lawyers not only encouraged land
sales but also laid a framework for the capitalist
development of Ohio. Their seemingly private legal work had
dramatic public effects. In Part III, this Article examines
another set of legal practitioners: elite commercial lawyers
in mid-nineteenth-century New York City. Account books
show that top New York lawyers devoted their practices to 
routine commercial work. This seemingly quotidian work
built the confidence that encouraged exchange in a risky
market. In addition to building confidence, New York’s 
lawyers also built institutions. Part IV analyzes the law
firms that grew out of the bar’s devotion to commercial work
and the way that these firms solidified the connections
between the legal profession and commerce. Finally, Part V
concludes by calling for both scholars and lawyers to take the
    
     
 
    
   
    
  
   
     
 
    
   




     
   
 
    
  
  
        
     
    
 
          
       
        
        
        
     
      
         
  
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1063
relationship between commercial legal work and economic
governance seriously.
I. LAWYERS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE 
For generations, scholars have debated whether and how 
the presence of lawyers affects economic growth. Their
studies range from the theoretical to the practical and rely
on methodologies from economics to sociology. Some have
argued that the United States has too many lawyers, that
law creates inefficiencies, and that businessmen dislike
using lawyers. Others have claimed that lawyers are 
valuable to commercial transactions, that they serve
important roles in and out of court, and that changes in legal
doctrine have spurred economic growth. Neither group,
however, has understood the depth to which the day-to-day
practice of lawyers is essential to the functioning of the
American economy.
A.   Economic Literature 
Economists are often critical of lawyers. Spurred on by
popular skepticism of the profession, scholars have
attempted to measure the effect of lawyers on American 
economic growth by comparing the United States to other
countries with fewer lawyers.5 Stephen Magee, the most 
prominent academic critic of the role of lawyers in American 
economic life, has argued based on international economic
data that the United States is oversaturated with lawyers
and that the profession’s excessive numbers hinder economic
5. See Frank B. Cross, Lawyers, the Economy, and Society, 35 AM. BUS. L.J.
477, 478–79 (1998) (noting the “widespread sense that lawyers are frustrating
business activity” and that “politicians have called for sweeping legal reforms in
response to the perceived effects of lawyers on the economy”); see also Marc
Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L.
REV. 633, 648–51 (1994) (discussing critiques). For more recent examples see, 
PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY IN
AMERICA (2009); PHILIP K. HOWARD: THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS 
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (2011).
   
    
     
  
       
   
   





     
    
 
         
         
    
       
           
    
          
   
         
  
        
       
       
      
        
     
     
          
 
          
      
            
         
      
       
      
     
        
         
          
1064 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
growth.6 Like other critics, he points to problems with tort
law and excessive regulation, blame for which he places at
the feet of lawyers. In response, Charles Epps has criticized
Magee’s data set and theoretical approach and found “no
support for the claim that lawyers in whole or part impair
economic growth.”7 Magee, however, refused to concede the 
point.8 Other scholars, such as Frank B. Cross, have parsed
data differently, concluding that lawyers have “no
substantial identifiable economic effect.”9 
In addition to these far-reaching quantitative studies,
scholars with a narrower focus have relied on the insights of
Ronald Coase to examine the effect of legal rules on specific 
types of exchanges.10 Others have pointed out the
6. See Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to
Epp, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 667, 667 (1992) (stating that “the United States has
40% too many lawyers; and that lawyer participation in U.S. politics advances
their interests at the expense of the U.S. economy”). Magee’s article appeared
after a debate on the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal. See Charles R.
Epp, Let’s Not Kill All the Lawyers, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1992, at A15; Stephen P.
Magee, Letter to the Editor, How Many Lawyers Ruin an Economy?, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 1992, at A17.
7. Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 585, 586 (1992). 
8. See Magee, supra note 6, at 668; Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The 
Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U.L. REV. 77, 82 (1993) (criticizing
Magee’s study); see also George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability, and Law Reform:
Effects on American Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV. U.L.
REV. 115, 124–25 (1993) (criticizing assumptions made in these studies); Kevin
M. Murphy et al., The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth, 106 Q.J
.ECON. 503, 529 (1991) (concluding, based on empirical study, that law schools
take talented students away from more economically productive occupations such
as engineering).
9. Cross, supra note 5, at 512. See also Philip Keefer, Lawyers and Economic
Growth—A Red Herring?, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 645, 645 (1992) (arguing that
the number of lawyers is a “poor proxy” for measuring the legal system’s effect on
the economy); Dean Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or
Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 275, 275–77, 283–97 (1992) (detailing recent growth 
of profession and reviewing theories for why the number of lawyers has
increased); Peter B. Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the
Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & ECON. 53, 81 (1977) (“The findings
of this study suggest the economic status of the legal profession is closely tied to
the performance of the economy and not to the scale of government regulation.”).
10. Ronald Coase provides a framework for examining the efficiency of legal
    
 
    
    
    
    
     
       
  
 
   
     
     
  
     
 
         
          
        
     
      
         
       
      
     
         
          
         
        
 
    
        
 
      
        
          
        
          
  
         
  
       
       
        
    
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1065
superfluousness of lawyers in commerce. Stewart Macaulay,
for example, used interviews with law firms and
businessmen to highlight the ability of businesses to deal
with disputes informally, outside of the legal system, and
without involving a lawyer.11 Robert C. Ellickson has found
similar attitudes and practices among California cattle
ranchers,12 and Larry Ribstein has explained why the
involvement of law and lawyers can limit trust between
contracting parties, increasing transaction costs.13 
The profession also has economic defenders. Gillian
Hadfield, for example, argues that lawyers offer numerous
benefits for their clients, but that prohibitive fee structures 
prevent many from receiving legal services at reasonable
rates.14 Others defend the profession’s current structure. As
systems. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960). For an overview of this literature, see Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic
Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1769–70 (2002); Cross, supra note 2, at 647
(analyzing criticisms of lawyers and arguing that the case against lawyers
“remains unproved”). For specific examples, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 92–93 (1989) (using transaction cost approach to argue for
importance of default rules); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027,
1033 (1995) (encouraging use of liability rules to “induce both more
contracting and more efficient contracting than property rules”); Keith N. Hylton,
A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 977, 977–78 (1996)
(analyzing tort law and finding that abnormally dangerous activity doctrine fails
to achieve its specified ends).
11. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61–62 (1963) (discussing hesitancy of
businessmen to turn to lawsuits and involve lawyers).
12. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628 (1986) (noting that
“potential disputants [sometimes] ignore the formal law” in favor of informal
norms); see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). For
more on the importance of informal norms, see David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s 
Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18
L. & SOC. R. 551, 553–54 (1984) (describing hesitancy of community members to
turn to the law).
13. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 576 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice
Through the (Un)corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43 (2014);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts
   
    
 
       
     
    
     
 
    
    
      
    
     
  
   
   
    
    
 
       
     
          
        
         
 
         
        
         
   
       
    
          
             
       
       
       
       
   
             
  
     
    
1066 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Nelson Miller points out, despite recent talk of the glut of
lawyers on the market, there has been an impressively
consistent demand for legal services.15 Another study found
that spending on legal aid lawyers significantly benefited a
community’s economy.16 Nearly all of this work, both
criticism and praise, is ahistorical, and it can benefit from
being put in context.
Institutional economists tend to be more interested in 
historical context, but they generally ascribe little
significance to lawyers and focus instead on other constraints
that make markets work.17 In his classic work on 
institutions, North identifies two such limitations. The first,
which he labels “formal constraints,” are explicit rules of 
conduct such as laws. The second, which he labels “informal
constraints,” are extensions of these formal rules, including
socially sanctioned norms and internally enforced standards 
of conduct.18 North argues that both of these constraints are
necessary. Law alone, in other words, is not enough to build
Regulate Legal Markets, DÆDALUS, Summer 2014, at 83; see also Benjamin H.
Barton, Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profession: Praise and
Critique, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 493, 494 (2012). As Barton points out, Adam
Smith originated many of these critiques in the Wealth of Nations. See id. at 495– 
96 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 136–40 (Modern Library
Paperback ed. 2000) (1776)). 
15. Nelson P. Miller, Lawyers as Economic Drivers—The Business Case for
Legal Services, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 71 (2012) (noting that unemployment for
lawyers was lower than the national average and that the number of people
employed in legal work had grown consistently over the last decade). 
16. See Linda Lund, The Economic Impact and Social Return on Investment 
of Alabama’s Legal Aid Providers, 76 ALA. LAW. 164, 165 (2015) (finding that the
“total Net Social Return on Investment for Alabama’s legal aid programs during
the 2014 fiscal year was 884 percent”); see also Al Jones, Lawyers a Boon to Local
Economic Development, MONT. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 7, 8 (“Local small business
start-up and expansion are the real drivers of economic growth for communities
and all need a variety of lawyers with specialized skills.”). Still others question
whether contributing to economic growth is even a valid measure of the
profession’s impact. See David W. Barnes, The Litigation Crisis: Competitiveness
and Other Measures of Quality of Life, 71 DENV. U.L. REV. 71, 73 (1993) (calling
for thinking about goals of legal system in broader terms).
17. See NORTH, supra note 4, at 33.
18. Id. at 36–53. 
    
    
 
 
    





      
   
    
 
     
        
     
   
     
   
    
      
  
    
 
   
     
 
     
    
     
  
 
     
      
 
        
    
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1067
a functional market. The more complex an economy, the
more necessary both types of constraints.
North wrote little about lawyers; this Article builds on
his theoretical work to highlight the important role that the
legal profession plays in not only enforcing private
agreements—formal constraints—in courts but also in
providing the informal constraints that made the market 
work outside of the courtroom.
Other contributors to the literature on lawyers and
economic development have helped to show—at least on a
theoretical level—the way that lawyers contribute to
institutional capacity in their out-of-court work. David
Driesen and Shubha Gosh, for example, argue that the legal
transaction costs that lawyers add that many scholars
understand as “evils that should be minimized or even
eliminated” are actually vital to exchange in a free market.19 
Because markets are imperfect, information costs money. 
Legal transaction costs, they argue, purchase information.
Viewed through this lens, transaction costs are not
necessarily burdensome fees that hinder exchanges that
would have happened anyway; they are instead essential to
the transaction. Some transactions that might happen if
transaction costs were systematically reduced might actually
make the parties worse off. Removing regulation or
discouraging the consultation of lawyers in transactions, for
example, might lead parties to buy or sell something whose
benefit or cost they underestimate.
Pierre Schlag similarly argues that the focus on 
transaction costs hides the essential role that law and legal
regimes play in economic exchange.20 When framing the
debate in terms of transaction costs, scholars idealize a
19. David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: 
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV.
61, 62 (2005). 
20. Pierre Schlag, Coase Minus the Coase Theorem—Some Problems with 
Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 203 (2013).
   
    
    
  
        
    
      
   
    
  
  
       
   




     
  
    
   
     
 
    
      
   
  
     
 
           
          
           
           
    
    
        
        
1068 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
model market, one without a legal regime. But as Schlag
points out, a legal regime affects the way exchange happens. 
Trying to understand what parties would do without first 
“specif[ying] . . . their legal entitlements” results in an
artificially constrained perspective.21 A focus on transaction 
costs, by idealizing a market that exists outside of a legal
regime, encourages actions in the name of “efficiency” that
would actually be better classed as “subsidization” of a
certain set of principles about how a market should function. 
In essence, discussions in terms of transaction costs
naturalize markets. As an alternative, Schlag calls for a
recognition that law plays a “constitutive role in the
performance of markets” and a scholarly legal analysis of
markets that builds on this insight.22 
This Article shows that lawyers, not just laws
themselves, are constitutive of the market. It also shows that
lawyers have played a much broader economic role than even
Driesen, Ghosh, and Schlag have identified. The profession’s 
historical roots thus demand that scholars rethink
conceptions of the role that government and law plays in the
market. Lawyers have not only assisted their clients but also
have provided basic controls central to market function.
B.   Close Study of Legal Work 
This Article’s close historical study of lawyers’ day-to-
day work also contributes to a related literature that
attempts to understand the role of lawyers in commerce by
analyzing in detail the kind of work private attorneys
undertake.23 Ronald Gilson’s classic study of business
21. Id. at 200. As Schlag points out, Coase recognized this as well. See id. at
218 (“[I]f we bracket the Coase Theorem, we find in Coase’s article some profound
critiques of the neoclassical model. The challenge was to revise the neoclassical
model altogether, so as to better recognize the ways in which law and legal
regimes help establish the identity and costs of production factors.”). 
22. Id. at 203.
23. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) [hereinafter Value Creation];
    
 
  
   
      
     
       
    
    
    
    
  
   
    
 
     
      
  
 
         
       
        
     
          
          
         
       
      
           
       
 
    
    
           
        
       
 
    
        
    
          
         
  
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1069
lawyers refers to them as “transaction cost engineers.”24 He 
argues that rather than adding transaction costs, lawyers 
help to create optimal “transactional structure[s],” which 
ensure that their clients are really buying or selling what
they think they are, resulting in “more
accurate . . . pricing.”25 Gilson suggests that lawyers (as 
opposed to other professionals) assume this role because they
are especially attuned to the regulatory environment in
which transactions occur.26 Lawyers end up working on non-
regulatory matters because of “economies of scope.”27 More
recent studies have bolstered this account. Mark Suchman’s
research on Silicon Valley lawyers, for example, finds that
“general business counseling, not intellectual property
practice, drove the growth of Silicon Valley’s law firms.”28 
And, with Mia Cahill, he has concluded that the lawyers at
these firms continue to play a vital role not only as
dealmakers and counselors but also as intermediaries
Ronald J. Gilson, How Many Lawyers Does It Take to Change an Economy?, 
17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 635, 638–39 (1992) (explaining necessity of
understanding what lawyers do in order to assess their economic impact);
Richard H. Sander, Elevating the Debate on Lawyers and Economic Growth, 
17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 659, 664 (1992) (calling for close study of lawyers); see
also DAVID HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT WHAT LAWYERS DO
(2013); George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS.
LAW. 279, 281 (2009) (revisiting Gilson’s piece and arguing that business lawyers
perform a broader set of tasks than Gilson noted); Elizabeth Pollman, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Where Are We and Where Are We Going?, 15 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 13, 15–19 (2014) (providing summary of recent literature on the
work of business lawyers).
24. Value Creation, supra note 23, at 243.
25. Id. at 255. 
26. Id. at 298. Not all scholars view the negotiation as a net positive for
economic transaction. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 227, 280–83 (2010) (arguing that “regulatory arbitrage” leads to some firms
bearing a disproportionate share of regulatory costs). 
27. Value Creation, supra note 23, at 298. 
28. Mark C. Suchman, Dealmakers and Counselors: Law Firms as
Intermediaries in the Development of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON
VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 71, 78 (Martin Kenney
ed., 2000); see generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE (2d ed. 2004).
   
    
     
  
   
   
  
     
    
   
       
    
  
 
   
      
    
 
     
     
  
      
    
   
    
 
          
    
     
         
         
 
          
        
          
   
           
    
    
1070 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
between venture capitalists and start-ups.29 Silicon Valley
lawyers, they argue, spend most of their time preventing
rather than fomenting disputes, relying on customs rather
than law.30 Similarly, Karl Okamoto finds that one of the
reasons that modern businesses rely on lawyers is that they
can serve as “reputational intermediaries,” building
relationships between businesses making deals.31 In her
study of Japanese lawyers involved in financial transactions,
the legal anthropologist Annelise Riles finds that they too
serve roles that have been overlooked by prior scholars.32 
Their “knowledge practices,” routines, and technical
expertise, serve to standardize, familiarize, and govern
financial transactions.33 
Although this work is important, it is rarely historical,
and it therefore cannot highlight the formative role the
American legal profession played in making capitalism work.
Thus, it cannot refute the “golden age” hypothesis that
argues that the significant role of lawyers is a relatively
recent (and harmful addition) to the American economy.
Additionally, because these scholars work on contemporary
lawyers, they have limited access to the work and
communication of the lawyers they study. Historical sources 
provide a fuller picture of legal practice. Finally, aside from
Riles, who studies lawyers outside of the United States, none
of these scholars recognize the important role that the legal
29. See generally Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as
Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 
21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1996).
30. See id. at 682 (“[N]either an elevation of rights consciousness nor a
disruption of commercial conviviality are inevitable consequences of an assertive
legal profession.”).
31. See Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV.
15, 18 (1995). But see Michael Bradley et al., Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the
Sovereign Debt Market?, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 150, 151–52 (2014) (arguing
that hiring outside law firms is actually viewed negatively by the market).
32. See ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011).
33. Id. at 20, 57–68. 
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profession plays in governance.
C.   Law and Development 
Scholars of economic development are much more 
interested in governance, but their work would benefit from 
more attention to the day-to-day work of lawyers. Most of 
this vein of scholarship attempts to isolate the factors that
encourage relatively quick economic growth in some 
countries like the United States but discourage growth in
others.34 Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff, for
example, argue that differences in climate and agriculture
influenced the development of growth-encouraging
institutions. Whereas European colonies near the equator
tended to grow crops such as sugar cane that relied on slave
labor and generated inequality, European colonies in North
America tended to develop smaller farms that encouraged
mixed agriculture and relatively equal societies.35 This
relative equality, in turn, fostered democratic institutions
and “broad participation in the commercial economy.”36 
Nathan Nunn’s work on economic growth in Africa, also
argues that slavery, and especially the slave trade, was one
of the primary reasons economic development in parts of 
Africa has proceeded slowly.37 Daron Acemoglu, Simon
34. For a broader overview of this literature see Cross, supra note 5, at 481
(“Studies have found relative national economic growth rates explained by too
large a government share, too small a government share, fertility rates,
education, culture, various components of government spending, savings rates,
inflation, composition of exports, civil instability, luck, and other factors. A
review of the literature indicated that ‘over 50 variables have been found to be
significantly correlated with growth in at least one regression.’ After subjecting
these studies to sensitivity analysis, the authors of the review found that most
associations were ‘fragile,’ and probably spurious.”) (internal citations ommitted);
see also Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law
and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 897 (2008)
(noting uptick in interest in studying role of law in development).
35. Stanley Engerman & Kenneth Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Inequality,
and Paths of Development Among New World Economies, 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9259, 2002).
36. Id. at 4, 35.
37. See Nathan Nunn, The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades, 123
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Johnson, and James Robinson, in a similar vein, argue that
it was the presence of colonial settlers and the institutions
they brought with them that allowed North American
colonies to develop economic institutions that encouraged
growth.38 
These broad accounts of the long-term importance of 
institutions are important, but none of them specify in detail
how institutions, and especially legal institutions, actually
contribute to growth. This Article’s findings build on these
macro-level works to provide micro-level detail on the role of
lawyers in building the institutions necessary for economic
growth. In that sense, this Article follows in the tradition of
political scientists who have identified particular social
institutions that may help promote good governance. For
example, Lily Tsai’s work on rural China finds that local
accountability can improve governance and “maintain social
stability,” sometimes promoting public goods that would spur
economic development.39 
This Article builds on these accounts with a historical,
qualitative analysis of the important role of lawyers in
American economic development. That account adds to this
literature by emphasizing the central role of the legal
profession in building legal institutions and making markets
function; in broader accounts, the legal profession is typically
only as a footnote in the institutional analysis.40 Moreover, 
Q.J. ECON. 139, 141 (2008) (“My results show that not only was the use of slaves
detrimental for a society, but the production of slaves, which occurred through
domestic warfare, raiding, and kidnapping, also had negative impacts on
subsequent development.”).
38. See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON.
R. 1369, 1395–96 (2001).
39. Lily Tsai, Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Goods
Provision in Rural China, 101 AM. POL. SCI. R. 355, 355, 370 (2007) (noting,
however, that “economic development is not necessarily correlated with political
or institutional development”).
40. The studies do not even consider numbers of lawyers, much less the work
that lawyers do. See Cross, supra note 5, at 480 n.12. If lawyers are talked about
in this literature it is usually because of the role they play using law to promote
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this Article begins a larger project of adding to this literature
what Frank Cross has identified as the “essential” input of 
scholars trained in the law, who are better equipped to 
understand the real-world operation of law and legal
institutions.41 
D.   History 
This Article also provides a new perspective for historical
scholarship, which has focused on the doctrine and discourse 
of lawyers rather than legal practice. Historical studies of the
legal profession in the nineteenth century have been
relatively rare. When discussing the profession, historians
tend to emphasize the roles its members play as politicians,
judges, and advocates.42 Robert Ferguson, for example,
describes a culture of elite lawyers in the early nineteenth
century who shared a vision of their profession as
“republican intellectual[s]” capable of acting as “guardians”
change, rather than in directly contributing to growth. See Davis & Trebilcock,
supra note 34, at 901 (discussing traditional understanding of role of lawyers in
development literature); see also id. at 916–17 (discussing obstacles lawyers can
present to legal change). 
41. See Cross, supra, note 10 at 1737 (“There remains a relative paucity of
academic legal research about the big picture. What particular mix of laws and
legal institutions encourage the ultimate overall economic welfare of society?”).
Cross calls for the kind of work this article undertakes. See id. at 1739 (“Legal
academics should build upon and enhance the existing economic research and
help discern the laws and legal institutions that facilitate the economic well-being
of nations.”).
42. See generally, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON, AMERICAN LAWYERS: PUBLIC 
SERVANTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION (2012); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE 
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971); 1
JULIUS GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Paul A. Freund 
ed., 1971); 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801–1815, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Paul A. Freund ed., 1981); CRAIG
EVAN KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
(1993); ELLEN HOLMES PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2011); G.S. ROWE, EMBATTLED BENCH: THE 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AND THE FORGING OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(1994); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (3d ed. 2007).
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of law and the country.43 Other historians have described the 
political activities of lawyers, noting the importance of law in
the build-up to the American Revolution and the prevalence
of lawyers in government in the early Republic.44 This focus
is reflected in the way that some think about the profession
today. They idealize “good lawyers,” like the framers of the
Constitution, while heaping scorn on “bad lawyers,” whose
private work adds transaction costs and seemingly throttles
market interactions.
Because of the focus on lawyers as judges and politicians,
most historical literature on U.S. economic development
tracks the evolution of legal doctrine. Morton Horwitz’s work
is a classic exemplar of this approach. In The Transformation
of American Law: 1780–1860, he argues that nineteenth-
century American judges used the discretion provided to 
them by the common law to “favor the active and powerful
elements in American society.”45 By using law as an
instrument of economic development, Horwitz contends that 
the courts helped to further inequalities and establish an
43. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 25, 84
(1984) (quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Chancellor Kent (June 5, 1832), in
MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT 235–36 (William Kent ed., 1838)).
44. See, e.g., JACK GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 154–55, 157 (2011); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE:
NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC 
WORLD, 1664–1830, at 205–06 (2005); John M. Murrin, The Legal 
Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in
COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (Stanley Katz
& John M. Murrin eds., 3d ed. 1983). Twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the
Declaration of Independence were legally trained, as were thirty-one of the fifty-
five members of the Constitutional Convention. See FERGUSON, supra note 43, at
12 (arguing that lawyers held a “virtual monopoly as republican spokesm[e]n”).
Contemporary observers agreed with this assessment. See Milton M. Klein, New
York Lawyers and the Coming of the American Revolution, in COURTS AND THE
LAW IN EARLY NEW YORK 88 (Leo Hershkowitz & Milton M. Klein eds., 1978) (“In
no country, perhaps, in the world is the law so general a study. The profession
itself is numerous and powerful, and in most provinces it takes the lead.”) 
(quoting Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies, (Mar. 22,
1775)). 
45. MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at
108 (1977).
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economic system that benefited businessmen and harmed
working people.46 This work has continued to strongly
influence histories of American economic development.47 
Thus, Charles Sellers writes in his classic work on the 
development of a national market that “[b]y taking control of
the state courts and asserting through them their right to
shape the law to entrepreneurial ends, lawyers/judges 
during the first half of the nineteenth century fashioned a
legal revolution.”48 
Recent scholarship challenges Horwitz’s perspective, 
arguing that lawyers played an important role in regulating,
rather than accelerating, the market’s growth. Most notably,
William Novak argues that common law legal precepts and
local regulation reigned in the worst excesses of capitalism.49 
46. See id.; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITION OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) (arguing that law
was mobilized to release individual creative energy and to mobilize resources to
create economic opportunity); BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW 
AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987) (arguing for a similar change in
eighteenth-century Connecticut); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760– 
1830 (1975) (tracking development of American legal system from community-
oriented colonial legal system to one better equipped to handle transactions in a
developing economy). 
47. See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, THE MARKET REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: LIBERTY,
AMBITION, AND THE ECLIPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD (2009) 23–25 (arguing that
American law developed “to favor enterprise and innovation at the expense of
vested rights or ancient customs”). Even very recent work on the history of
capitalism focuses on lawyers as law makers. See, e.g., JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS
OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF CAPITALISM AND RISK IN AMERICA 18 (2012)
(noting that judges played an important role in setting legal ground rules for
insurance, futures trading, and other economic developments).
48. CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815– 
1846, at 48 (1991) (“By taking control of the state courts and asserting through
them their right to shape the law to entrepreneurial ends, lawyers/judges during
the first half of the nineteenth century fashioned a legal revolution.”).
49. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 42 (1996) (arguing that the maxims salus
populi and sic utere tuo “were the common law blueprints for governance in a
well-regulated society.”). See also DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD
WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 559 (2007) (citing
Novak and discussing importance of common law principles in the nineteenth
century). This focus on law as discourse avoids some of the problems caused by
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Brian Balogh, too, has drawn attention to the influence of 
lawyers in organizing courts and in “devlop[ing] a discourse
that was shared across the states, and influenced the very
way that many Americans defined political issues.”50 Despite
their differences with Horwitz, these scholars also focus on
lawyers’ roles as litigators, legislators, and judges, not as
practitioners.
Historical scholarship on the role of doctrine and
discourse has opened up important avenues of research, but 
by focusing on what lawyers said, wrote, and published
rather than what they did in their day-to-day practice, this
scholarship provides a limited portrait of the profession’s role 
in American life.51 For every major, doctrinally shifting
appellate case, judges made hundreds of simple trial court 
decisions. And for every one of those, lawyers performed
dozens of actions on behalf of their clients out of court. Some 
elite lawyers championed a broad ideal of the profession as 
guardians of the state, but the papers, account books, and
writings of lawyers reveal that lawyers had already adopted
a narrower, private-law-focused vision of the profession by
the late eighteenth century.52 Most lawyers, even those 
the older, instrumental approach.
50. BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 13 (2009).
51. A few scholars have written about the practice of individual lawyers, but
this work does not put their practice in conversation with the work on economic
development. See, e.g., GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, PRACTICING LAW IN FRONTIER
CALIFORNIA 51–113 (1991); MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776–1876, at 148–50 (1976); Maxwell Bloomfield, Law vs. 
Politics: The Self-Image of the American Bar (1830–1860), 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
306–23 (1968).
52. Scholars of frontier lawyers have noticed the technical proficiency of
frontier lawyers but like the historians who have written about law in settled
regions, they tend to focus on courts rather than the day-to-day work of lawyers,
they therefore miss the state building that took place in private practice.
Lawrence Friedman’s brief treatment in A History of American Law has had 
outsized influence in shaping the literature. Friedman takes a dim view of the
frontier bar and judiciary. “Polish and legal skill,” he writes “were in short
supply.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 108 (3d ed. 2005)
(1973). In this view, Friedman seconds Anton Chroust, who writes of a
“discouragingly primitive” bar dominated by uneducated, illiterate judges. 2
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actively engaged in politics and constitutional theorizing,
earned a living through the practice of private law, especially
on behalf of commercial clients. This technical vision was
fully embraced by even elite members of the bar by the 1830s.
Although lawyers continued to serve as politicians and
judges, political engagement was no longer seen as an
essential component of professional identity. Instead,
mastery of the legal tools of commerce took center stage.
To provide a broad view of the role of the legal profession
in the nineteenth century, this Article analyzes the work of
lawyers in two different places at two different times: first,
on the Ohio frontier in the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, where lawyers worked as land agents for eastern 
speculators; second, in mid-nineteenth-century New York 
City, where lawyers worked for the most active businessmen
in the United States. On the Ohio frontier, the lawyers who
were some of the first easterners to settle in the West
provided essential services that allowed for the division and
sale of western land. Their approach to these land
transactions and other problems faced by their clients led
them to expand eastern legal and economic norms west. 
Their practice shows the importance of their work to the
establishment of a capitalist market on a relatively
unpopulated frontier. In New York City, a study of the
practice of lawyers reveals that lawyers were not only critical
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 92– 
93 (1965). Most of the literature on frontier lawyers is focused on refuting this
impression. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, The Bar on a Frontier: Wayne
County, 1796–1836, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 136, 156 (1970) (finding that
Michigan’s early judges “performed their duties in a meet and proper manner”);
Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Frontier Justice: Wayne County 1796–1836, 16 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 126, 135, 137 (1972) (concluding that lawyers were “craft-conscious
practitioners” who demonstrated “genuine reliance on legal authorities”); Kermit
L. Hall, Hacks and Derelicts Revisited: American Testimonial Judiciary, 1789– 
1959, 12 W. HIST. Q. 273, 280 (1981) (arguing that territorial judiciary was
composed of an “educated elite”); see generally Maxwell Bloomfield, Western 
Lawyers and Judges: Image and Reality, 24 J.W. 15 (1985) (discussing bar in
California); Anita S. Goodstein, Leadership on the Nashville Frontier, 1780–1800, 
35 TENN. HIST. Q. 175 (1976) (discussing bar in Nashville); C. ROBERT HAYWOOD,
COWTOWN LAWYERS: DODGE CITY AND ITS ATTORNEYS, 1876–1886, at 46–68 (1988)
(discussing bar in Kansas).
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to the expansion of commerce but also to its daily
functioning. Together the two case studies illustrate the
pervasiveness of the commercial work of lawyers along with
the diverse roles they established for the profession in
American economic life.
II. OHIO 
The absentee land speculators who owned most of 
northeastern Ohio needed expert assistance inspecting and
managing their land, drafting transactions, ensuring that
buyers paid their mortgages, collecting when they did not, 
accounting for transactions, verifying the accuracy of deeds,
examining titles, paying taxes, suing and defending suits,
and more.53 Lawyers did all of these things. Not only as
attorneys-at-law but also as de facto accountants, managers,
salesmen, and bankers, they facilitated the market for land
in Ohio, expanding the boundaries of American capitalism
west. In so doing, they staked out essential commercial roles. 
Understanding the work of these lawyers is important not
only because it helps to explain the growth and the
development of Ohio—which transformed from an isolated
territory in 1800 to a fast-growing state of 937,903 in 1830— 
but also because it reveals that lawyers were intertwined
with commerce even at the beginning of the Republic.54 
Lawyers on the Western Reserve encouraged
53. Because living on the frontier was difficult and often unpleasant, land
speculators expressed little interest in settling there. Instead, they planned to
divide that land and then sell it at great profit to migrants. See R. DOUGLAS HURT, 
THE OHIO FRONTIER: CRUCIBLE OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1720–1830, at 168–78
(1996).
54. See id. (discussing importance of division of land by speculators);
Christopher Clark, The Ohio Country in the Political Economy of Nation
Building, in THE CENTER OF A GREAT EMPIRE: THE OHIO COUNTRY IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 146, 150 (Andrew R.L. Cayton & Stuart D. Hobbs eds., 2005)
(arguing that division into small parcels of land led to growth); Walter Licht,
Envelopment, 103 (May 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(“[T]he transfer of federal lands to private interests represents perhaps the
greatest input of the federal government to the growth and development of the
U.S. economy in the nineteenth century.”).
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transaction. By organizing, officiating, and overseeing 
economic transactions, they provided the organization that
capitalism needed to function. During the first half of the
nineteenth century, Ohio was critical to the development of 
American industry, agriculture, and commerce in the United
States, and it became the “center of a great empire.” 55 
Lawyers were at the center of that center. The study of law
on the frontier thus shows that the seemingly unencumbered
free market did not begin to function until it was encumbered
by lawyers; law and the legal profession, in other words, were 
constitutive elements of the economy. In terms of the debate
about the role of lawyers in American economic life, a study
of Ohio’s first lawyers illustrates that, as Gilson and others
have argued, lawyers make transactions possible. It shows, 
however, they were essential to commercial transaction even
before the rise of the twentieth-century administrative state.
To understand why there are so many lawyers in the United 
States now we must first understand why there were so
many on the frontier.
A.  Sources 
Part of the reason that the private work of lawyers has
drawn little attention from scholars is that this work is
difficult to see—unlike legislation or appellate opinions, most
of it was unpublished. Although frontier lawyers kept 
records of their practice, most of these have not survived.
Reconstructing the practices of frontier lawyers from letters, 
account books, and vignettes by later members of the bar is
difficult.
Elisha Whittlesey’s papers provide a rare window into
the day-to-day practice of law on the Ohio frontier.
Whittlesey moved to the Western Reserve, a roughly
hundred-mile stretch of land located in northeastern Ohio, in
1806. Whittlesey’s account books, correspondence, and other 
55. ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, Introduction, in THE CENTER OF A GREAT EMPIRE, 
supra note 54, at 2.
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papers offer a picture of the extensive transactional work
that lawyers undertook once they arrived on the Reserve.
Account book entries for clients offer statements of
Whittlesey’s work and the amount his clients paid him. They
show him charging $0.25 for “drawing an article,”56 receiving
a $10.50 “[c]ommission for selling $350 worth of land to C.
Fitch,”57 and earning $0.50 “commission on collecting $10.”58 
Letters with clients illustrate Whittlesey partitioning land
into segments of unverifiable size,59 repossessing land for
unspecified prior debts,60 and transferring deeds to be given
to anonymous purchasers.61 
Whittlesey’s legal career shared much in common with
the careers of other elite lawyers on the Reserve.62 Like
Whittlesey, most lawyers moved to Ohio to improve their
financial standing and because they believed that economic
development of the frontier would soon take off.63 And like
56. See Elisha Whittlesey, Ledger (1807–1817) (on file with the W. Reserve
Historical Soc’y) (recording charge for Hermon of Canfield for $0.25).
57. Elisha Whittlesey, Ledger (1811–1814) (on file with the W. Reserve
Historical Soc’y). 
58. Id. 
59. See Letter from E.D. Whittlesey to Elisha Whittlesey (June 1, 1816) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (discussing difficulties with dividing
land, difficulties with transportation, requesting Whittlesey “to proceed
immediately to partition,” and granting power of attorney “to convey my part of
the location”).
60. See Letter from Tucker & Carter to Elisha Whittlesey (June 5, 1818) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (requesting redemption of $700 debt
with land).
61. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Oct. 2, 1807) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (“[I] inclose to you my deed . . . thereby
approving of the contract you made with him.”).
62. See generally Marc Harris, Social Entrepreneurs: Economic Enterprisers
and Social Reformers on Ohio’s Western Reserve, 1795–1845 (1983) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University). Most frontier lawyers, however,
did have a more comprehensive education than Whittlesey. 
63. Whittlesey wrote that he moved to the frontier because he believed “that
[a] young man, with good habits . . . and industry, with good practical common
sense . . . might make a living in a new country and be respected.” Elisha
Whittlesey, quoted in Kenneth Edwin Davison, Forgotten Ohioan: Elisha
Whittlesey, 1783–1863 at 14 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Western
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Whittlesey, most lawyers spent most of their time working
on matters related to land sales.64 A study of Cleveland
lawyers in the 1810s found that when lawyers came to court, 
they spent most of their time partitioning land.65 Court 
records reveal that legal work in Trumbull County, the home
of Warren and Youngstown, two of the most important cities
on the Reserve, was also dominated by land. In one 1815
session of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, the
court heard petitions for a Sheriff’s conveyance of land,
petitions for partitions, and trespass actions.66 The only non-
land cases on the docket were debt cases. Because notes and
Reserve University). Lawyers on the East Coast faced intense competition and
they instituted fee schedules that forced young lawyers to charge the same
amount as their more experienced colleagues. See GERARD W. GAWALT, THE
PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1840 at 94, 109 (1979) (discussing competition and fee
schedules in Massachusetts); Gerard W. Gawalt, Sources of Anti-Lawyer
Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740–1840, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 304–05
(1970) (discussing controls lawyers exerted on entry into the Massachusetts bar).
Similar price controls existed in Connecticut. See Roger Minott Sherman,
Account Book (1796–1803) (on file with the Fairfield Historical Soc’y).
64. Examples of land work abound in lawyers’ papers. The lawyer George
Tod’s earliest work in Ohio, for example, involved drafting deeds for land sales
by John Young, the founder of Youngstown, Ohio. See Deed of John Young (May
13, 1801) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (selling $1867.75 of land
to James Gibson). Tod also drafted agreements for clearing lumber, securing
debts with land, and selling land. See Copy of Agreement to Chop Lumber (June
12, 1802) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y); Agreement to Settle Debt
of $15.23 (June 8, 1810) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y); Agreement
to Sell $150 of land (Dec. 9, 1803), (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y).
The lawyers Turhand Kirtland and John S. Edwards too established extensive
out-of-court land practices. See 1 HARRIET TAYLOR UPTON, A TWENTIETH CENTURY 
HISTORY OF TRUMBULL COUNTY OHIO: A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF ITS HISTORICAL
PROGRESS, ITS PEOPLE, AND ITS PRINCIPAL INTERESTS 149 (1909). They continued
to conduct plenty of out-of-court work even after the courts opened See also
Harris, supra note 62, at 95 (“A frontier lawyer’s business involved mostly land
cases, which mean that his time would largely be taken up with the land agent
who often sent him business.”). 
65. JAMES HARRISON KENNEDY & WILSON M. DAY, THE BENCH AND BAR OF
CLEVELAND 24 (1889) (“The record of four years, from May, 1810 to May, 1814,
embraces one hundred and nine civil suits, the greater number being petitions
for partition of lands, and generally of non-resident heirs, mostly living in
Connecticut.”).
66. See George Tod, Notes on Court Cases (July 1815) (on file with the W.
Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
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land sales were so intertwined, these cases likely involved
land, either as the object of the loan or as collateral.67 As
Whittlesey’s practice records indicate, lawsuits involving
land accounted for only a small portion of extensive and
wide-ranging Reserve practices related to land. Other
Reserve lawyers, whose private records have been lost,
therefore likely performed the same kind of diverse, land-
related work found in Whittlesey’s account books.
B.  Setting 
The extremely isolated Western Reserve was not a place 
where one would expect to find lawyers. The Reserve grew
from Connecticut’s claim to land in the Ohio River Valley,
which had been granted by King Charles I.68 Connecticut 
ceded most of its claim to the United States in 1786 but
retained the rights to the northeastern corner of what would
eventually become the state of Ohio. More than three million
acres of this 120-mile-wide parcel became the Western 
Reserve, which the state sold for $1.2 million in 1795 to a
group of land speculators.69 After the land was surveyed, the 
company divided the land into parcels scattered throughout 
the Reserve.70 
Even in the 1820s, the Reserve was separated from
eastern society by a desolate wilderness.71 Conditions in the
Western Reserve were not only inconvenient but also
dangerous. Reports circulated of lawyers falling into rivers
67. Id.
68. See ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, OHIO: THE HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 29–30 (2002). 
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See ZERAH HAWLEY, A JOURNAL OF A TOUR THROUGH CONNECTICUT,
MASSACHUSETTS, NEW-YORK, THE NORTH PART OF PENNSYLVANIA AND OHIO,
INCLUDING A YEAR’S RESIDENCE IN THAT PART OF THE STATE OF OHIO, STYLED NEW
CONNECTICUT, OR WESTERN RESERVE 9 (1822).
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and dying,72 and even being chased by packs of wolves.73 The 
Reserve’s slow, irregular, and insecure mail service further
isolated it from the East.74 Warren, one of the largest and
most important cities in the early Reserve, had no regular
post until 1802,75 and in Cleveland new routes were still
being established in the late 1810s.76 Rather than trusting
the postal service, lawyers on the Reserve sometimes sent
letters with visitors to “save the risque of transportation.”77 
Even that did not always work.78 In the second decade of the 
72. The lawyer John S. Edwards fell in a river in 1813 and died before he
could be brought to a doctor. See LOUISA MARIA EDWARDS, A PIONEER HOMEMAKER,
1787–1866: A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF LOUISA MARIA MONTGOMERY, 36–37 (1903).
73. See UPTON, supra note 64, at 154 (“Judge Huntington once fought a pack
of wolves within what is now the residence portion of Cleveland with an umbrella,
and owed his deliverance to this implement and to the fleetness of his horse.”);
see also JOSEPH BADGER, A MEMOIR OF REV. JOSEPH BADGER; CONTAINING AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, AND SELECTIONS FROM HIS PRIVATE JOURNAL AND 
CORRESPONDENCE 25 (1851) (describing being followed by a “large wolf”).
74. Lawyers and clients frequently complained of, and attempted to
circumvent, the mail. See, e.g., Elisha Whittlesey, Letter (May 18, 1809) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (noting that mail from “Pittsburgh to
Warren has not been very regular”); letter from E.D. Whittlesey to Elisha
Whittlesey (June 1, 1816) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (“Your
letter from some strange cause was very tardy. It must have been owing to neglect
of Postmasters, whether willful or not, I am not able to say. In case the late letter
I sent you should be also backward, I will observe that we wish you to proceed
immediately to partition.”).
75. See LEONARD CASE, EARLY SETTLEMENT OF TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 8 
(1876). In 1803, Warren’s mail route was extended to Pittsburgh, but the 150 mile
journey took ten days for carriers on foot. See WILLIAM GANSON ROSE, CLEVELAND:
THE MAKING OF A CITY 57 (1950) (describing Cleveland to Erie route, established
in 1808, which took thirty miles a day on foot).
76. See EDMUND H. CHAPMAN, CLEVELAND: VILLAGE TO METROPOLIS 17 (1964)
(noting mail line established between Cleveland and Painsville in 1818).
77. Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Sept. 3 1810) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) See also Letter from Elisha Sterling to
Elisha Whittlesey (Aug. 31, 1819) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) 
(instructing lawyer to send money with a neighbor who was visiting Ohio rather
than entrusting it to the mail); Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey
(May 29, 1820) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (requesting
Whittlesey to give letter to another person to have it brought to him).
78. Letter from E.D. Whittlesey to Elisha Whittlesey (June 1, 1816) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (discussing problem with initial attempt at
transferring a power of attorney form).
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nineteenth century, they cut bills in half and sent them in
separate envelopes to prevent theft.79 
Despite its isolation, ambitious lawyers were among the
earliest residents on the Western Reserve.80 Dozens of
practitioners, who inhabited the well-framed houses and
owned the better clothes that distinguished them from their
neighbors on the frontier, would transform the frontier, not 
in public politics, but through private legal work.81 
79. See, e.g., Letter from E.D. Whittlesey to Elisha Whittlesey (Mar. 24, 1817)
(on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
80. In 1799, the lawyer John Stark Edwards settled twenty-five miles west of
the Pennsylvania border, where he established Mesopotamia. He had to build his
own house and returned to Connecticut for the winter. EDWARDS, supra note 72,
at 8. George Tod, who finished his legal education in 1796, was one of
Youngstown’s first residents when he moved there in 1800. See supra note 64; see
also Jeffrey P. Brown, Samuel Huntington: A Connecticut Aristocrat on the Ohio
Frontier, in OHIO’S WESTERN RESERVE: A REGIONAL READER 45, 47 (Harry F.
Lupold & Gladys Haddad eds., 1988) (noting that George Tod “came to the
Northwest as a representative of Connecticut Land Company shareholders”).
Calvin Pease, another lawyer from Connecticut, settled in Youngstown that same
year. 1 HISTORY OF TRUMBULL AND MAHONING COUNTIES WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 208 (1882). William Woodbridge and Elijah Bottom
Merwin also arrived before Ohio statehood, moving to Marietta in 1799 and 1801,
respectively. MILES MERWIN (1623–1697) ASSOCIATION, 1 THE MERWIN FAMILY IN
NORTH AMERICA: A GENEALOGY OF MILES MERWIN (1623–1697) IN THE MALE LINE 
THROUGH THE TENTH GENERATION 92 (1978); Woodbridge, William, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/ 
biodisplay.pl?index=w000709 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). At the time, the
township was small, having only reported 173 “free white male inhabitants” in
the 1800 census. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1800 UNITED STATES FEDERAL CENSUS. 
Homer Hine, another Connecticut lawyer, moved to Ohio soon after he finished
studying law in 1800, settling first in Canfield and then Youngstown. MILES
MERWIN (1623–1697) ASSOCIATION, supra, 211–12.
Even if lawyers had not founded a town, they were often among its first residents.
Samuel H. Huntington, who studied law with his stepfather, moved to a “nearly
depopulated” Cleveland in 1801 after seven years of legal practice in Connecticut. 
CHARLES WHITTLESEY, EARLY HISTORY OF CLEVELAND 382, 384 (1867); see also
Brown, supra note 45, at 46. Job Doane, whose father founded East Cleveland
Township, stayed on the frontier and became a lawyer. See BADGER, supra note
73, at 95 (discussing Esquires Doanes in Euclid); Andrew Cozad, History of East
Cleveland Town 1 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Kelvin
Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University) (mentioning Nathanial
Doane’s settlement of East Cleveland in 1800).
81. Later Ohioans bragged incessantly about the importance of these lawyers,
“[t]he products of the best families; the sons of Revolutionary statesmen and
    
    
    
    
    
  
   
     
   
 
     
   
   
  
 
    
      
   
   
  
 
       
        
     
         
         
           
 
            
         
   
    
        
  
 
       
      
    
       
    
      
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1085
C.   Legal Work 
The demand for legal expertise on the frontier came from 
eastern buyers and sellers. Both settlers and land
speculators wanted certainty that title to the land that they
were buying was secure.82 Absentee sellers needed help
managing their land, paying taxes, ensuring the accuracy of 
deeds, negotiating sales, collecting notes, suing delinquent
debtors, and accomplishing a host of related tasks.83 No
individual landholder made enough money on speculation to
justify paying a full-time employee in Ohio.
Later such diverse tasks would be undertaken by
accountants, bankers, real estate agents, managers, title
agents, and insurers, as well as lawyers. In the early
nineteenth century, however, such specialized professionals
were rare. Even clerks, who in the nineteenth century
performed many of the bureaucratic functions of business,
were relatively uncommon until after 1830.84 As late as 1870,
white-collar workers made up less than three percent of the 
American workforce.85 Accountancy became an established
professional category only in the twentieth century.86 
Revolutionary soldiers; the graduates of the foremost colleges of the East; the
legal seedlings of the best American culture of the day, ready to ripen in the virgin
soil of New Connecticut.” KENNEDY & DAY, supra note 65, at 10–11.
82. This concern was represented in advertisements for Western Reserve
land. One speculator proudly claimed that title to the land he sold was “certain, 
easy to be traced, and free from all controversy.” Uriel Holmes, Farms and New
Lands, LITCHFIELD GAZETTE, Apr. 13, 1808. 
83. See Harris, supra note 62, at 60 (“Legal business was potentially good
from the very beginning of settlement because of the confusion of titles and the
prospects of large land sales.”); Timothy J. Shannon, “This Unpleasant Business”: 
The Transformation of Land Speculation in the Ohio Country, 1787–1820, in THE
PURSUIT OF PUBLIC POWER: POLITICAL CULTURE IN OHIO, 1787–1861, at 15, 22
(Jeffrey P. Brown & Andrew R. L. Cayton eds., 1994) (noting “scarcity of money”
on frontier).
84. See Michael Zakim, Producing Capitalism: The Clerk at Work, in
CAPITALISM TAKES COMMAND: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 223, 223 (Michael Zakim & Gary J. Kornblith eds., 2012). 
85. Alba M. Edwards, The “White-Collar Workers,” 38 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
501, 504 tbl.3 (1934). By 1930, the percentage had climbed to 16.3%. Id.
86. See GOOGLE NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?
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Lawyers filled the gap. Not only were they trained to
read and understand complicated legal texts, they were also
familiar—and deeply involved—with the promissory note-
based financial transactions on which the economy depended
in the early Republic. Along with an understanding of the
basics of ledger keeping, most lawyers were capable of acting
as financial agents. They were also willing to undertake
many other tasks for their clients. They executed the 
technical tasks normally associated with lawyering, and the
broader set of functions on which land sales depended. 
Because lawyers were the ones performing this extensive
array of tasks, they shaped the form that the western market
assumed. Lawyers brought eastern standards about markets
and law west, and they implemented and enforced these 
standards, even before the Ohio government had the power
to do so.
The broad variety of legal roles is illustrated in 
Whittlesey’s work on behalf of his client Elisha Sterling, for
whom he started working as soon as he moved to Canfield.
Their collaboration lasted for nearly thirty years and during 
this time, Sterling delegated to Whittlesey the work of selling
his Ohio land.87 By the book, selling land was a
content=accountant&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing 
=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Caccountant%3B%2Cc0 (illustrating spike in
use of term “accountant” after 1900).
87. Correspondence exists in Elisha Whittlesey’s papers from 1806 to 1833.
See Elisha Whittlesey Papers (1806–1833) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical
Soc’y). Sterling had graduated from Yale in 1787 and then studied law, but by
the time Whittlesey began working for him, much of his time was spent on
business ventures, especially land speculation. See DAVID S. BOARDMAN, 
SKETCHES OF THE EARLY LIGHTS OF THE LITCHFIELD BAR 33–34 (1860); Charles F.
Sedgwick, Fifty Years at the Litchfield County Bar: A Lecture Delivered Before the
Litchfield County Bar, in THE BENCH AND BAR OF LITCHFIELD COUNTY,
CONNECTICUT 1709–1909: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF MEMBERS HISTORY AND
CATALOGUE OF THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL HISTORICAL NOTES 68, 86 (Dwight C.
Kilbourne ed., 1909).
Sterling does not appear to have been one of the initial investors in the
Connecticut Land Company. Because the pace of development on the Reserve was
slow and the competition for sales intense, however, land prices on the Reserve
were depressed and wary speculators or heirs of initial investors were willing to
sell. See Shannon, supra note 83, at 23–25; JON T. COLEMAN, VICIOUS: WOLVES
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straightforward process. The seller drafted contracts of sale,
conveying the land and often instituting a payment scheme 
that the two parties would sign. When the buyer completed 
payment, the deed would be conveyed. Even on the East 
Coast, however, transactions could be complicated by unclear
titles, defaults, and disputes over mortgage contracts.
Lawyers verified that a deed accurately described the land,
collected debts, repossessed land, and appeared in court to
defend their clients’ interests. In the Western Reserve, 
speculators needed even more extensive work from their
lawyers.
Before land could be sold it had to be looked after. 
Whittlesey managed workers, hiring them to clear and
survey land, and perform other unspecified tasks.88 
Whittlesey also paid taxes, travelling the fifteen or so miles
to Warren to pay them in person, and negotiating the
sometimes complex rules that would result in forfeiture if not
AND MEN IN AMERICA 127 (2004).
As for other speculators, selling land was a relatively hands-off enterprise for
Sterling. The most active role they played was in placing advertisements in
eastern newspapers to attract buyers. See VISIONS OF THE WESTERN RESERVE:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS OF NORTHEASTERN OHIO, 1750–1860, at 96–97
(Robert A. Wheeler ed., 2000); see also HARLAN HATCHER, THE WESTERN RESERVE:
THE STORY OF NEW CONNECTICUT IN OHIO 71 (1949). Ads trumpeted the benefits
of “acres of new land . . . in the Western Reserve” for sale within “the increasing
& flourishing state of Ohio.” Holmes, supra note 82. They promised that with “a 
small sum,” settlers could secure land “in a country unusually healthy, and which
afford[ed] a prospect of soon containing a greater number of rich and independent
Farmers, than any section of America.” Id. Thanks to the Reserve’s “rapid
settlement,” “rich and fertile” soil, “industrious enterprising inhabitants,” mills,
schools, and stores, an “industrious cultivator of the earth” would find “certain
and never failing sources of wealth.” Id.
88. See Elisha Whittlesey, Account Book (1806–1817) (on file with the W.
Reserve Historical Soc’y) (noting payment of other people on behalf of Elisha
Sterling). 
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followed.89 Whittlesey also routinely inspected land,90 
examined its boundaries and features,91 researched titles,92 
vetted sellers, drafted conveyances,93 transferred deeds,94 
and registered sales with the state.95 If a plot “possesse[d] no 
particular advantages over the land adjoining,” it would be
sold for market rates.96 On the other hand, if Whittlesey
found coal, limestone, or another especially valuable feature,
the price would be adjusted upward.97 
In the next step, Whittlesey would ensure that Sterling
held clear title, checking that the lot had not already been
89. See letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (May 2, 1808) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (noting that if land tax had not been paid
the land “would have been exposed for sale” and explaining complicated tax
requirements).
90. Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (May 29, 1820) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (instructing Whittlesey to examine
boundaries of the “Landon Lot”). 
91. Id. (Sterling inquiring about the lot’s “[b]oundries so that [he] can convey
it”); Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Oct. 10, 1810) (on file with
the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (noting that Whittlesey found coal and limestone
on the land).
92. Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Oct. 2, 1804) (on file with
the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (“[B]ut before the deed is delivered [I] wish you
to be fully satisfied that the Lot belongs to me and has not been conveyed by
myself or masterman to any other.”); Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha
Sterling (May 2, 1808) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (noting costs
incurred examining titles in August, 1807).
93. See Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Oct. 2, 1804) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (approving of contract drafted by
Whittlesey).
94. See, e.g., id. (“[I] inclose to you my deed . . . thereby approving of the
contract you made with him”). 
95. See, e.g., Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (May 2, 1808)
(on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (listing work of recording a deed in
August, 1807). 
96. Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (May 15, 1810) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
97. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Oct. 10, 1810) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
    
     
      




    
  
   
     
          
   
      
   
 
      
    
 
          
        
        
       
             
  
           
       
             
  
         
    
 
         
  
        
      
       
  
        
     
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1089
sold by Sterling or a business partner, for example, and
verifying that there were no liens on the property.98 
Whittlesey then prepared sales contracts that might include 
payment plans or liquidated damage clauses.99 Sterling
delegated all of this work to Whittlesey, who made decisions 
he assumed would be “agreeable” to Sterling.100 
As in the rest of the country, Ohio land sales depended
on credit. In the words of one seller, there was simply “no
money.”101 This dearth of a medium of exchange dated back 
to colonial times when many states had printed their own
paper currency as a way to get around a general lack of
circulating specie in the colonial economy.102 The effects
varied, but the colonial money printing was blamed for a host
of ills including uncertain pricing, “currency gluts,” and
depreciation significant enough to lead some to revert to 
bartering.103 Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which
barred states from coining money and printing currency was 
98. Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Oct. 2, 1804) (on file with
the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (requesting that Whittlesey verify “that the Lot
belongs to me and has not been conveyed by myself or Masterman to any other”).
99. See, e.g., id. (detailing contract providing for payment from seller to
purchaser of $3 per deficient acre if the lot were too small and a payment of $3
per additional acre if the lot were larger than specified).
100. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (May 2, 1808) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (“I expect this arrangement will be
agreeable to you. If not I wish you on the receipt of this to give me immediate
information.”). Whittlesey and Sterling only disagreed occasionally. See, e.g., 
letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (May 27, 1811) (on file with the
W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (defending against accusations of overcharging for
work). 
101. Shannon, supra note 83, at 22 (quoting John May, an Ohio Company
agent). This problem was common to the whole territory. Id. 
102. See Christine Desan, Contesting the Character of the Political Economy in
the Early Republic: Rights and Remedies in Chisolm v. Georgia, in THE HOUSE 
AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 178, 193 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002).
103. Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New
England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303, 1313–14 (2001).
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drafted to prevent these problems in the future.104 Although 
this provision prevented the confusing array of regional
depreciating currency that characterized America before the 
Revolution, it still left the American economy without a
reliable and accessible means of exchange. Specie was rare
and difficult to source, especially because it was frequently
exported to pay for goods from abroad.105 The federal
government did little to help. Not until the Civil War would
the treasury begin to print paper money under the authority
granted to it by the Constitution.106 As a result, exchange
was difficult.107 Business came to depend on promissory
notes, basic instruments of exchange that allowed for
transactions on credit. Moreover, because many land buyers
did not have the means to pay without a mortgage,108 and
because banks were not common in the Western Reserve
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
105. “State governments as well as merchants found themselves handicapped
by the shortage of circulating media, both in collecting their revenues and in
paying their accounts.” MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 72 (1970) (noting that a large amount of specie was sent overseas).
106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (permitting Congress to coin money); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from coining money). For more on the
history of money, see MYERS, supra note 105, at 163 (“[U]niform paper
currency . . . made possible the elimination of the motley array of state bank
paper which had so long plagued the economy.”). 
107. See Cathy Matson, Public Vices, Private Benefit: William Duer and His
Circle, 1776–1792, in NEW YORK AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
STATE, 1780–1870, at 72, 88–91 (William Pencak & Conrad Edick Wright eds.,
1989). The shortage of currency affected everyone from farmers, to merchants, to
states who collected taxes. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA:
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 98 (1957) (noting that speculators and
farmers wanted states to issue more paper money). 
Shays’s Rebellion was at least in part a protest against a lack of circulating
money. See id. at 96. Businessmen also lamented the lack of cash. William
Bingham, the Philadelphia trader, shipper, and land speculator, wrote to
Alexander Hamilton to encourage him “by all possible means to increase the
quantity of circulating medium.” Id. He recommended paper currency because “it
cost[] the country a vast sum of productive labor to purchase the necessary
quantity of [specie] to discharge the duties of circulation.” Id.
108. See Shannon, supra note 83, at 22 (noting that in the “cash-strapped
economy [of Ohio] any land sales were usually on credit over an extended time”).
    
    
  
    
    
    
       
      
         
      
       
 
 
      
    
       
        
     
       
     
   
   
 
              
 
  
            
        
   
         
          
 
          
       
         
          
          
        
  
          
 
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1091
until mid-century, buyers relied on landholders like Sterling
to provide financing.109 In addition to drafting mortgage
contracts, Whittlesey also ensured that mortgagees kept up
their payments.110 The use of mortgages and promissory
notes brought Sterling and other speculators into a
sometimes complicated web of debt, in which all parties
involved had to carefully balance income and outlays to
ensure they had the means to pay when a note came due.
Whittlesey collected and accounted for payments, receiving
money in person and by the mail.111 Because he dealt with
the lenders, borrowers, purchasers, and sellers in the 
Western Reserve, he was able to advise Sterling which loans
were likely to be paid on time, which were likely to be late,
and which were worthless.112 When possible, Whittlesey
secured suspect notes with a debtors’ property. In one case
Whittlesey traveled “forty miles” to visit a sickly debtor and
then inspect “three or four thousand acres of forest lands” for
“quality of soil and local situation.”113 Detailed accounting
helped Sterling to avoid liquidity problems: Whittlesey made
sure that when Sterling had to pay one of his creditors that
he had sufficient funds. Whittlesey also sent profits back 
109. See Harris, supra note 62, at 59; Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha
Sterling (May 15, 1810) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (discussing
payment plan for a land sale).
110. See, e.g., Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (July 3, 1809)
(on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (discussing mortgage holder who
claims to have paid off his land).
111. See Elisha Whittlesey, Ledger (1811–1814) (on file with the W. Reserve
Historical Soc’y) (documenting “money paid you by” and “money sent you in a
letter”).
112. See Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Oct. 7, 1816) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (requesting accounting of “what has been
paid & what is yet due & the probability of Collection as we have a statement of
each Debt we could then determine what would be proper for us to do with
Robbins”); see also Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Nov. 17,
1807) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (listing Sterling’s notes and
explaining their status).
113. Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (May 27, 1811) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
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1092 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
East, either through the mail or with a friend.114 
When disputes arose over title, payment, or collection,
Whittlesey handled the dispute and, if necessary, went to 
court.115 He negotiated with buyers in default,116 took
depositions,117 and repossessed property.118 Repossession 
could be lengthy and complicated, as an 1808 dispute 
between Sterling and a buyer recorded only as “Bradley”
attested. When a buyer defaulted, Whittlesey generally
attempted first to negotiate or to encourage the debtor to sell
his property.119 If that didn’t work, Whittlesey’s next step
was to bring suit—often a slow process. For reasons that
Whittlesey did not specify in his letters to Sterling, he was
unable to file suit against Bradley in June of 1808.120 In the 
fall of 1808, Whittlesey again attempted to sue Bradley in
the Court of Common Pleas. At court, however, Bradley’s
attorney did not appear, supposedly due to illness. Although
Whittlesey was skeptical—he believed that Bradley’s
114. See Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Oct. 2, 1804) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (requesting that Whittlesey pay debts and
send the extra money back East); Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha
Whittlesey (Aug. 31, 1819) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (making
arrangements for Whittlesey to send money with a neighbor).
115. See, e.g., Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Sept. 12, 1831)
(on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc.y) (discussing claims against Asa
Keyes). 
116. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Ansel Sterling (Mar. 22, 1808) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (discussing ongoing negotiations with a
debtor in default). 
117. See, e.g., Letter from Elisha Sterling to Elisha Whittlesey (Aug. 5, 1813)
(on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (requesting that Whittlesey take
depositions).
118. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Oct. 1, 1809) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (discussing selling of repossessed land).
119. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Ansel Sterling (July 6, 1807) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y); Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha
Sterling (Mar. 22, 1808) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
120. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (Nov. 22, 1808) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
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attorney “neglected attending court to have [the] cause put
over”—the judge postponed the case.121 The delay worked,
but only temporarily.122 After a trial in the summer of 1809,
the judge issued an execution for Sterling to repossess 
Bradley’s land.123 Although the records are ambiguous, it
appears that Bradley’s lot was divided and sold in pieces over
the next few years.124 In cases like these, Whittlesey used his
status as a member of the bar to make convincing threats,
and he brought suit when threats did not work.
The distance between Whittlesey and Sterling
necessitated constant communication. Whittlesey updated
Sterling on his maintenance, selling, finance, and legal
representation in letters sent from Ohio. Between 1806,
when their correspondence began, and 1836 when Sterling
died, the two exchanged eighty-four letters, the most
concentrated in the first ten years of their work together. In
the early nineteenth century, when mail service was slow,
and “[r]eceiving a letter was, for most Americans, an event
rather than a feature of ordinary experience,” such lengthy
and frequent correspondence was highly unusual for most, 
but not for lawyers.125 A lawyer’s constant and detailed
121. Id.
122. After attempting once more to negotiate with Bradley, Whittlesey finally
brought the suit before a judge. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Ansel
Sterling (Nov. 22, 1808) (on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y).
123. Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (July 3, 1809) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
124. See Elisha Whittlesey, Ledger (1811–1817) (on file with the W. Reserve
Historical Soc’y) (listing charge for surveying “Bradley lot so much as is sold to
Phil Beardsley”). 
125. DAVID M. HENKIN, THE POSTAL AGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 17 (2006). Even in the 1850s,
the average American sent only five letters per year, and most of this mail was
concentrated in urban centers. See id. at 31. Communication was so important to
Whittlesey and Sterling that they were both willing to pay costly postage fees,
assessed based on the long distance their letters traveled. See id. at 18–19
(discussing expense of postage); Elisha Whittlesey, Ledger (1811–1817) (on file
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correspondence with his client helped him to overcome the
problems posed by working from a distance.
Whittlesey’s reports give a sense both of the scope and
diversity of his work:
Letter of Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling, May 2, 1808.
In this letter, Whittlesey accounted for 1807 and 1808,
with the expenses ranging from tax payments (in January,
March, and August, 1807), to payments on a note (in June,
1807), to costs incurred examining titles (in August, 1807),
to paying for recording a deed (in August, 1807). Whittlesey
noted money received from a variety of sources in amounts
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y).
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from $120 (in April, 1807) to $5 (in July, 1808). In addition
to listing expenses, Whittlesey also summarized the amount 
spent and received, in this instance $542.92 and one-half and
$537.46 respectively.
Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling, November 17,
1807
In this second report, Whittlesey listed outstanding
notes. Sterling held a note signed by Alisha Chapman, dated
June 9, 1806, for example, in which Chapman promised to
pay Sterling $256.33. Whittlesey also listed twelve other
outstanding notes. When relevant, he added pertinent
information such as an explanation that the remaining
amount due on one note was $28.30 because $72.50 in cattle
had already been paid. In addition, two other notes were the
result of judgments in courts, and the execution of each was
stayed for nine months. Whittlesey’s work as agent,
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accountant, lawyer, and manager merged within these 
reports, allowing him to summarize the entirety of Sterling’s
frontier business.
Although Sterling was one of Whittlesey’s biggest
clients, he performed similar work for dozens of others. He 
helped Samuel Smedley address errors committed by land
auditors;126 used his power of attorney to “partition” and
“convey” E.D. Whittlesey’s land;127 drafted power of attorney
forms for “Hermon of Canfield”;128 “took depositions for
lawsuits” and traveled to “negotiate purchase . . . of land” for
Elijah Wadsworth;129 paid taxes on land “west of Cuyahoga,”
and “explor[ed] R.R. Township” for John Calhoon and
Nathaniel Rollin;130 paid Matthew Whittlesey’s “high way”
“county” and “state tax”;131 sold land on behalf of the New
York merchants August Hammett and William Lane;132 
brought a “petition for partitioning lands of Joseph Storey &
Others” at the request of Turhand Kirtland;133 sold a massive
lot worth $2410 for Samuel B. Flores of Philadelphia;134 
received and sent money, collected interest on loans, and
paid judgments on behalf of Judson Canfield;135 and traveled
to Cleveland for William Winthrop “to take the Depositions
of John Williams” in relation to a suit.136 
126. See Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Samuel Smedley (Apr. 21, 1812) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
127. Letter from E.D. Whittlesey to Elisha Whittlesey (June 1, 1816) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
128. Elisha Whittlesey, Ledger (Number 12) (on file with the W. Reserve
Historical Soc’y).
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id. at 33. 
131. Id. at 30. Matthew Whittlesey was related to Elisha, but he appears to
have paid the same rates as other clients. 
132. Id. at 42. 
133. Id. at 39. 
134. Id. at 188.
135. Id. at 71; see also id. at 143, 159.
136. Id. at 112. 
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Whittlesey, then, played a significant role in land sales
and other transactions for dozens of clients. The sketchier
records left behind by his colleagues suggest that they too
were performing a similar quantity of work for large groups 
of clients as well. Their effects were amplified by the large
number of lawyers on the frontier. The western migration of
lawyers was so substantial that the Reserve almost certainly
had more lawyers per capita than the East did. The ratio of
lawyers to population in Northeastern Ohio was probably at
least five or ten times what is was in Connecticut or
Massachusetts.137 Even these estimates possibly understate
the pervasiveness of lawyers. In the Reserve’s tiny towns, the
presence of a single lawyer would have boosted a town’s
lawyer to population ratio immensely, amplifying his
influence. In aggregate, the work of lawyers thus played an
enormous role in transaction on the Reserve.138 
Not only did lawyers enable transaction, they also
ensured that transaction in the West mirrored legal and
137. In 1800, there was roughly one lawyer for every 2100 people in
Connecticut and one for every 2900 in Massachusetts. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
supra note 80. County-level census records are not available for Ohio in 1800, but
even ten years later, fewer than 20,000 people lived on the Reserve. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 1810 UNITED STATES FEDERAL CENSUS. Considering that Ohio’s 
population grew fivefold during that period, it is safe to assume that
approximately 4000 people lived on the Reserve in 1800. See id. At eastern ratios
that would have entailed one or two lawyers. Yet by 1801, at least five lawyers,
trained by the same teacher, had already moved to the Reserve. In
Massachusetts, Gerard Gawalt found 200 lawyers in 1800, and calculated the
ratio of lawyers to population at 1: 2872. GAWALT, supra note 63, at 200. I
calculated the population of the Western Reserve in 1810 by using county-level
data available from the 1810 U.S. Census.
138. Although the strong connection to Connecticut was unique to the Western
Reserve, the westward migration of lawyers—and the high ratio of lawyers to
population—was not. In 1830, when there was only one lawyer for every four
hundred people in New York City, the ratio of lawyers to population in Chicago
was as high as 1:85. Even in 1847, there was approximately one lawyer for every
three hundred residents. See Deborah L. Haines, City Doctor, City Lawyer: The
Learned Professions in Frontier Chicago, 1833–1860 62 (May 12, 1986)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago). 
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economic standards in the East. Lawyers brought their legal
training with them and addressed frontier problems by using
those tools. By organizing transaction, lawyers helped to 
regulate the market for land.
Lawyers brought legal standards to the most sparsely
inhabited parts of Ohio. Canfield, founded in 1798, only
contained seventeen homes and a single store in 1805.139 By
1811, Whittlesey and other lawyers there produced
conveyances for their land speculator clients that would have
looked at home in New England (or England):
[T]he said Ephraim paying or causing to be paid $134 by the 1st day
of July 1810, with Interest, $134 by the first day of July 1811 with
Interest, and $134 by the first day July, 1812 with Interest, and the
said Ephraim agrees on his part to pay or cause to be paid to said
Sterling the said several sums of Money or to his said agent in
Canfield at the times above specified in consideration of said
Sterling’s conveying or causing to be conveyed the said Lot of land
after the said last payment shall become due and payed and it is
further agreed between the parties above that if the said lots of land
should not contain one hundred thirty four acres that the shall be
deducted from the last payment at the rate of $3 per acre for each
and every acre thus deficient and to be added in the same proportion
for each acre it should over measure the above quantity of one
hundred and thirty four acres in Witness where of we have here
unto lot and lands (two witnesses’ signatures).140 
Here were the hallmarks of a professional legal
approach: The contract was specific, used legal terminology,
included a three-part payment plan with interest, a
liquidated damages clause, and was signed by two witnesses.
Other surviving documents demonstrate a similar concern 
139. RICHARD ULRICH, AN EARLY HISTORY OF CANFIELD: 1776 to 1876, at 4, 22
(1980).
140. Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Elisha Sterling (July 3, 1809) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). Other documents were similarly technical.
See, e.g., Deed from John Young of Youngstown (May 13, 1801) (on file with the
W. Reserve Historical Soc’y); Agreement to Chop Lumber (June 12, 1802) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y); Indenture for Land Use (Feb. 14, 1803) (on
file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y).
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for legal rules. In 1802, for example, a lawyer drafted an
agreement for clearing “all the timber and bushes” from the
land owned by one of his clients.141 The contract was lengthy
and precise.142 It contained a liquidated damages clause,
specifying that the brush clearer had to pay double his fee if
he failed to perform.143 This agreement demonstrated none 
of the informality that might be expected in a small
settlement on the periphery of the country. Instead, it
treated the development of the frontier—the clearing and
settling of land—as a legal process dependent on procedures 
dictated by lawyers. Lawyers enforced and demanded these
standards even when the frontier was relatively
undeveloped.
The use of such complex legal forms was made possible
by the density of lawyers on the frontier and by their
devotion to their professional methods. Lawyers solidified
these standards by assuming roles in frontier government.
When Cleveland established its first court in 1810, the city
only had fifty-seven residents, yet the first presiding judge
was a lawyer, Benjamin Ruggles, who had come to Ohio from
Connecticut in 1807.144 Records from the early years of the 
court show 109 civil suits in its first few years, and seven
different lawyers appeared before Judge Ruggles before
1814.145 Court filings that took the same form and followed 
the same technical rules of law used in the East.146 Litigants
pressed judges to require opposing parties to amend faulty
141. George Todd Contract (June 12, 1802) (on file with the W. Reserve
Historical Soc’y). 
142. Id. It was detailed enough to exclude “three trees” from clearing.
143. Id.
144. See ROSE, supra note 75, at 63; see also Ruggles, Benjamin, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/ 
biodisplay.pl?index=R000500 (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
145. ROSE, supra note 75 at 73.
146. Tod’s filing used technical legal language and included a copy of the
contract. George Tod, Complaint in Court of Common Pleas (Mar. 1811) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y).
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documents,147 and often persuaded them to throw out
meritorious suits because they failed to meet technical
pleading requirements.148 Exceptions were noteworthy.
When a judge postponed a case because of a lawyer’s dubious
claim of illness, it was surprising.149 By applying exacting 
legal standards, lawyers treated divisions of frontier land as
transactions that should be channeled into an existing legal
framework. Within just a few years, organization of property
on the frontier was just like property transactions elsewhere
in early national America: Increasingly, they were the 
province of lawyers.
Later members of the Ohio bar imagined a simpler time
when lawyers spent their time “writing deeds, wills and
contracts and in the trial of litigated cases of small
consequence,” when, “[i]t was not necessary for them to solve
the mysteries and unravel the intricacies of modern 
business.”150 Likewise, historians have described the 
“unsubstantial” work of “debts, accounts, notes, contracts, 
titles, foreclosures, ejectments, and bankruptcy” that made
up early frontier practice.151 This work, however, was neither
simple nor unimportant. Both in and out of court lawyers
were critical to the sale and distribution of land on the
147. Id.; see also letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Ansel Sterling (Nov. 22, 1808)
(on file with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (describing the pleading problem in
fuller detail). 
148. See letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Ansel Sterling (Mar. 22, 1808) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y) (“I believe Bradley is now foreclosed from
having his account set off on the Note. By our statute it is necessary to give notice
when pleading that the defendant intends to exhibit his amount against the pltf.
which Mr. Hays his attorney has failed to do.”). 
149. Letter from Elisha Whittlesey to Ansel Sterling (Nov. 22, 1808) (on file
with the W. Reserve Historical Soc’y). 
150. 1 CARRINGTON T. MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF
OHIO, at xiv–xv (1934).
151. Paul E. Wilson, How The Law Came to Kansas, 15 KAN. HISTORY 18, 34
(1992).
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Reserve. They handled hundreds of small and large decisions
for clients, making transactions possible. They laid the
groundwork for development of the frontier, playing a role
normally associated with government, when they
encouraged settlement and helped to ensure that land
transactions met eastern standards.
The contribution of private legal work to the 
institutional foundations of economic growth is
counterintuitive. We are conditioned to distinguish private
law from public law. From this perspective, the private work
of lawyers looks like the work of intermediaries rather than
of the government itself. Perhaps this is also why scholars of
economic development have tended to understate the 
profession’s role. As the political scientist Timothy Mitchell
has pointed out, however, governments have “porous
edges.”152 On these boundaries, “official practice mixes with
the semiofficial and the semiofficial with the unofficial.”153 
Close attention to the boundaries of the relatively weak
government in early Ohio illustrates that it was never
completely distinguishable from society, and that, by
patrolling this middle ground, lawyers in Ohio played roles
normally associated with government officials.
This framework explains the larger significance of 
private lawyers’ day-to-day practice. Lawyers were not just 
acting as intermediaries between the government and
speculators, they were the government. When migrating to
the Reserve, lawyers brought state- and market-making
capabilities with them. Their work established technical
legal standards, clarified titles, organized transactions, and
instituted patterns and practices that allowed the sale and
distribution of Western Reserve land on a scale that would
not otherwise have been possible.154 Their professional skills
152. Timothy Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and
Their Critics, 85 AM. POL. SCI. R. 77, 82 (1991). 
153. Id.
154. See generally HURT, supra note 53, at 168–77 (discussing importance of
   
    
 
   
      
    
    
    
 
    
    
 
      
     
      
   
 
    
    
      
     
    
     
      
 
     
     
         
      
        
    
       
      
        
       
        
     
       
 
     
1102 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
and assistance on adherence to technical detail allowed them
to regulate transaction. In this process, lawyers were not just
intermediaries, they were private bureaucrats. As they
divided land and organized the frontier, they built the state
and they governed the market; Ohio became a lawyer’s 
frontier. Without lawyers’ work, buyers and sellers of land
would have been hard-pressed to create and control the 
market for land that was essential to Ohio’s development.
III. NEW YORK 
Commercial work was valuable not just on the frontier
but also at the center of American commerce: New York City.
Despite New York’s well-regulated municipal government155 
and the relative ease with which it could be monitored by the
Federal and state government, lawyers played just as
important a role in the city’s economy as they had on the
frontier. In nineteenth-century New York, lawyers did not 
need to set up the market—they needed to make it work.
Elite New York lawyers performed a wide variety of
tasks for their clients. For real-estate speculators, they
researched and examined complicated titles; for traders, they
drafted agreements and settled disputes; for insurers, they
prepared policies and fought over interpretation; for
manufacturers, they established financing and organized
partnerships; and for bankers, they secured loans and
division of land by speculators); Christopher Clark, The Ohio Country in the
Political Economy of Nation Building, in THE CENTER OF A GREAT EMPIRE: THE 
OHIO COUNTRY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 150 (Andrew R. L. Cayton &
Stuart D. Hobbs eds., 2005) (arguing that the division of land into small parcels
led to growth); see also Walter Licht, Envelopment, 103 (May 7, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“[T]he transfer of federal lands to
private interests represents perhaps the greatest input of the federal government
to the growth and development of the U.S. economy in the nineteenth century.”).
In other frontier economies lawyers played a similar role. See STEPHEN ARON, 
HOW THE WEST WAS LOST: THE TRANSFORMATION OF KENTUCKY FROM DANIEL
BOONE TO HENRY CLAY 150 (1996) (“The engrossment of land, the rule of lawyers,
the privatization of property rights, the power of merchant-manufacturers, and
the entrenchment of slavery transformed the Bluegrass from the world of Daniel
Boone to that of Henry Clay.”).
155. See NOVAK, supra note 49, at 43–44. 
    
    
     
    
      
     
     
   
    
  
   
    
   
  
     
   
     
  
     
 
  
   
    
    
    
     
     
   
    
 
 
        
     
         
   
      
       
         
   
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1103
deposits. To understand how these actions made the
economy work, it is useful to view their work in terms of
Douglass North’s framework of formal and informal
constraint.156 Recall that formal constraints are explicit rules
of conduct and that informal constraints are extensions of
these formal rules, including socially sanctioned norms and
internally enforced standards of conduct.157 Markets, 
particularly complex markets in which participants do not 
know each other, need these kind of constraints to prevent 
market participants from breaking promises. This Part
argues that the work of lawyers was a private complement to
public structures. Through their services, lawyers provided
both kinds of constraints: the formal, by ensuring that 
agreements would be enforceable in court and by enforcing
agreements when necessary, and the informal, by cultivating
a legal culture that expressed adherence to higher values
outside the market. These lawyers did more than just
navigate regulatory regimes; they cultivated trust in a
market full of risk.
By establishing relationships of trust with their clients
and building institutions to support these relationships, New
York lawyers facilitated the complex and anonymous
financial transactions on which their clients’ fortunes
depended.158 By embracing commercial work, Lord and his 
colleagues not only facilitated economic growth but also built
an elite bar that served wealthy business enterprises in the
name of justice. Building on the work of earlier lawyers, they
shaped the future of the profession and the American
economy.
156. See generally NORTH, supra note 4, at 36–53.
157. See id. at 36–53. 
158. See id. at 53; see generally STEPHEN KNACK, TRUST, ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE,
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22–28 (2010), https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/27247. This approach qualifies Lawrence Friedman’s claim that
New York’s “small but sophisticated bar of commerce” was made up of men who
“were basically courtroom lawyers.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 232 (3d ed. 2005).
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A. Sources 
This portion of the study depends on the records of Daniel
Lord and the law firm that he started, records that currently
are held by a lawyer who worked for the firm that Lord
founded.159 Born in Stonington, Connecticut in 1795, Lord
moved to New York City with his father and mother when he 
was a small child.160 After graduating second in his class at
Yale, Lord immediately studied law, and he joined the New
York Bar in 1817.161 Although Lord’s practice gained an
immense reputation, it never extended obviously into the
public sphere.162 Lord spent his entire career as a private 
lawyer, working for more than five decades for large and
influential commercial actors in New York. His law practice 
“embraced every variety of law, real property, commercial
law including revenue cases, and the law of shipping and
insurance.”163 Eventually, Lord formed the firm Lord, Day &
Lord, which at its peak employed more than 120 lawyers and
became one of the top firms in New York before dissolving in
1994.164 Lord was especially successful, but his practice 
shared much in common with other top commercial lawyers
159. The lawyer received the records after the firm went bankrupt. Lord, Day
& Lord dissolved in 1994 following a vote by its partners. Jan Hoffman, Oldest
Law Firm Is Courtly, Loyal and Defunct, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at 33.
160. See 6 FRANKLIN BOWDITCH DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE
GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE: WITH ANNALS OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY 679 (1885).
161. Lord finished his legal education by clerking with George Griffin in New
York. MEMORIAL OF DANIEL LORD 9 (D. Appleton & Co. 1869) [hereinafter
MEMORIAL].
162. He was so well respected by other members of the bar that when he died,
all of the courts in New York City were closed in his honor. As the New York
Times reported in a lengthy article the next day, “[n]one of the Federal, State or
City Courts did anything beyond the calling of the jury rolls, or some other slight
preliminary business, before motions were made to adjourn.” Local Intelligence: 
Death of Daniel Lord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1868, at 2.
163. DEXTER, supra note 1610 at 679. 
164. Lawyers attributed the firm’s failure to be “confirmation that a somewhat
romanticized way of law-firm life [was] over, that the profession [had] become a
business.” Hoffman, supra note 159, at 33. As one of the firm’s partners put it,
“[t]he coin of the realm ceased being loyalty, predictability and continuity . . . and
became money, money and money.” Id.
    
     
   
   
 
   
 
     
   
      
    
   
  
   
   
    
  
    
   
    
 
 
        
   
          
        
   
 
    
       
     
       
 
       
        
       
     
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1105
in New York. His papers thus show how a small group of
lawyers—in 1830 there were just 450 lawyers in the entire
city—made New York’s massive economic growth possible.165 
B.  Setting 
When Daniel Lord started his legal practice in 1817, the
economic system that lawyers were helping build in Ohio
was already booming in New York City. Although New York
had been a major hub of commerce for decades, its population
and importance grew dramatically during the nineteenth
century. In 1820, the city boasted a population of 123,706,
making it the largest in the country, and it continued to grow
at an average rate of sixty-five percent per decade
throughout the nineteenth century, twice the rate of the
national average during the same period.166 By 1860, New
York City was home to more than 800,000 people;167 sixty-
four percent of the country’s imports and thirty-five percent 
of its exports traveled through New York’s harbor.168 Its 
industry also took off, leading it to become one of the most 
important manufacturing locations in the world.169 New
York traders, merchants, manufacturers, bankers, insurers, 
and speculators monopolized the economy and exerted 
influence across the country and around the world.170 
165. THOMAS J. FRUSCIANO & MARILYN H. PETTIT, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY AND
THE CITY: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 59 (1997).
166. Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban
Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990, at tbl.5, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
(June 15, 1998), https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/ 
twps0027/tab05.txt.
167. Id. at tbl.9. 
168. William Pencak, Introduction to NEW YORK AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF
AN AMERICAN STATE, 1780–1870, at xii (William Pencak & Conrad Edick Wright
eds., 1989). 
169. See generally SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY 
AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896 (2001); NEW
YORK AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 168.
170. See BECKERT, supra note 169, at 18.
   
    
   
    
   
    
  
  
     
    
  
     
  
    
   
 
    
    
     
     
   
    
    
    
   
 
 
      
            
       
      
 
    
         
      
     
     
           
       
      
  
1106 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Although the New York economy grew rapidly over the
course of the nineteenth century, the upward trajectory
would not always have been obvious to those active in
commerce. In the volatile American economy of the
nineteenth century, amidst the “radical uncertainty of
capitalism,” even experienced commercial actors understood
failure firsthand.171 According to one historian’s calculations,
approximately twenty percent of Americans living in the
early nineteenth century would become insolvent during
their lifetimes.172 Among businessmen, the prognosis was 
worse. In 1850 San Francisco, for example, nearly seventy
percent of merchants failed.173 Oft-circulated nineteenth-
century common wisdom pegged the number even higher,
suggesting that ninety-seven percent of merchants
eventually became insolvent.174 
For participants in the market, the causes of ruin
sometimes appeared opaque. The Panic of 1819, for example,
inaugurated an economic depression that lasted until 1821
and led to the failure of hundreds of businesses and the
impoverishment of thousands; yet unlike in prior economic
downturns, Americans could point to no obvious cause,
natural or manmade, to blame for the crisis.175 Other 
dangers were more obvious. In the complex and specialized
economy that developed in nineteenth-century New York, 
market participants rarely knew the people with whom they
171. LEVY, supra note 47, at 18.
172. See SCOTT A. SANDAGE, BORN LOSERS: A HISTORY OF FAILURE IN AMERICA 7 
(2005) (citing PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA:
INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900, at 287–88 
(1974)).
173. Id. at 7.
174. Id. (citing HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN 41 (Harper & Bros. Publishers
1950)); Edward Balleisen pegs the rumored number at a still unbelievable ninety-
five percent. EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND 
COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 3 (2001).
175. See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, THE MARKET REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: LIBERTY,
AMBITION, AND THE ECLIPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD 39–45 (2010). Prior panics
could be blamed on “drought, revolution, or wartime embargoes.” SANDAGE, supra
note 172, at 29.
    
       
  
       
  
     
    
   
      
    
     
    
   
     
  
 
       
          
  
       
        
     
      
             
         
     
         
      
       
  
           
       
      
         
         
       
  
           
  
    
       
         
         
    
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1107
traded.176 The incentive for fraud of every kind increased, 
because it was harder to discover.177 Fraudulent bank notes,
either forged or issued without backing, frequently passed in
commerce.178 Moreover, trade with sometimes distant
strangers meant that far-off problems could lead to local
crisis. A run on a remote bank might pose disaster as 
enterprises fell, leaving hundreds of debtors in their wake.179 
The risk (and fear) of failure haunted market participants.
Some committed suicide when faced with economic ruin.180 
Others sublimated their fears by turning to reform 
campaigns, attacking gambling and the random risks it
posed, thereby distinguishing the market’s rewards as based
on rationality rather than chance.181 Still others obsessed
over the “get-rich-quick scheme[s],” “confidence games” and
176. Even simple economies, however, face the problem of transaction costs. As
economists have realized, one of the primary inefficiencies faced by market
economies is caused by the problem of cooperation. In ideal situations—in which
each party has perfect knowledge, the parties are repeat players, etc.—trade can
happen with perfect efficiency. Perfectly efficient trade never happens in the real
world. Instead, the cost of information, the lack of repeated transactions, and
other hindrances, inject market transactions with expensive transaction costs.
See NORTH, supra note 4, at 11–16. For a historical analysis of exchange in a
relatively simple economy, see generally BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND
STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987).
177. See NORTH, supra note 4, at 34–35. In a simple economy, the difficulties
of cooperation in trade are ameliorated by the familiarity of participants.
Reputation and solvency are relatively easy to ascertain and fraud consequently
easy to punish. See id.
178. Determining whether a note was fraudulent was difficult in 1830 when
about three hundred banks existed in the United States; by 1850 with “more than
ten thousand different kinds of paper” in circulation, it became significantly
harder. See STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: CAPITALISTS, CON
MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 6–9 (2007); JANE KAMENSKY, THE
EXCHANGE ARTIST: A TALE OF HIGH-FLYING SPECULATION AND AMERICA’S FIRST
BANKING COLLAPSE 16–17 (2008).
179. For an example of one such failure and its effects, see generally
KAMENSKY, supra note 178, at 115–64. 
180. SANDAGE, supra note 172, at 6–7.
181. Ann Fabian shows how middle-class Americans used gambling reform
campaigns to distance themselves from the risk inherent in the market. See
generally ANN FABIAN, CARD SHARPS, DREAM BOOKS, & BUCKET SHOPS: GAMBLING 
IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA 59–107 (1990). 
   
 
 
     
  
   
  
    
     
       
     
 
     
    
     
     
    
    
      
        
      
   
   
     
 
 
     
        
    
   
         
     
         
          
  
    
1108 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
“mania for speculation” that characterized the era.182 
Despite these challenges, the antebellum American
economy grew more complex and expanded at unprecedented
rates. Although the market remained volatile throughout the
nineteenth century, Lord’s commercial clients vigorously
participated in commerce. They built enterprises that made 
them wealthy while the American economy expanded and
contracted at unprecedented rates.183 With legal support,
they were able to build enterprises that secured their wealth,
and positioned New York at the center of American
commerce.
C. Building Legal Practice 
Like many other lawyers, Lord began his practice by
building on personal connections. One of his first major
clients was the Crary family, to whom he was related
through his mother.184 The Crarys had been in the dry goods
business since the turn of the century.185 Lord initially
represented the family’s patriarch, Edward Crary, but he
eventually worked for his sons and the firm they established,
P. & J.S. Crary & Co.186 Lord’s work for the Crarys touched
on all of his major practice areas. He drafted many power of
attorney forms, provided “advice & services” related to 
purchasing orders, reviewed contracts, and examined
titles.187 He, and eventually his partners as well, worked for
members of the Crary family into the 1860s, providing them 
182. MIHM, supra note 178, at 15. 
183. North attributes this economic growth to the strength of American
institutions, whose importance, he argues, increased with the market’s 
complexity. NORTH, supra note 4, at 25. 
184. Lord’s connections with his mother and wife were particularly important
because his father was not wealthy. See MEMORIAL, supra note 161, at 4–5. 
185. 2 WALTER BARRETT, THE OLD MERCHANTS OF NEW YORK CITY 80 (1870).
186. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordan III).
Lord’s work before that date was mostly minor drafting work. See id.
187. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
    
      
     
     
 
    
   
 
      
   
    
 
    
   
   
     
     
  
   
     
 
    
       
         
  
           
      
    
         
       
       
      
      
         
  
       
       
  
      
      
 
   
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1109
with over fifty years of legal services.188 Lord developed a
similar relationship with the De Forest family, to whom he
was related through his wife. The work started in 1819, once
again with the simple tasks of drafting deeds, affidavits,
leases, and powers of attorney. His relationship soon
developed with the rest of the family, whom he assisted with 
the redemption of notes and a variety of minor lawsuits.189 
After his kinship ties gave Lord a foothold in the
competitive world of New York law, he came to the attention
of other economic actors.190 In his second decade of practice 
Lord began to attract work from new clients, including John
Jacob Astor, the fur trader and one of the richest men in 
America, whom he first encountered while working for the
Crarys. By the 1830s, Lord’s client list had grown
significantly, thanks in part to the prominence that his
representation of Astor gave him.191 Lord represented a
significant and diverse set of the most important businesses
in New York including the “[m]erchants, traders, and clipper
ship operators” B. Aymar & Co., the Stebbins Brothers & Co. 
188. See Daniel Lord, Letters (1864–1865) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
189. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordon III)
(listing charges for De Forest and Son, John De Forest, L & G De Forest,
Lockwood De Forest, John H. De Forest, and David C. De Forest).
190. Lord’s colleagues recognized the importance of his connections to the
development of his firm, but saw no dishonor in working for family members. See, 
e.g., Victor Wolfgang Von Hagen, Introduction to JOHN LLOYD STEPHENS, 
INCIDENTS OF TRAVEL IN EGYPT, ARABIA PETRÆA, AND THE HOLY LAND, at xiii
(Victor Wolfgang Von Hagen ed., Dover Publications, Inc. 1970) (quoting Letter
from John Lloyd Stephens to Benjamin Stephens (Nov. 28, 1822) (writing
admiringly of Lord’s “very active friends” who “interest[ed]
themselves . . . openly” in his career when he was a young lawyer)). 
191. According to Judge Blatchford, in a remembrance before he adjourned the
New York Circuit Court in honor of Lord: 
[T]he case which first gave him professional éclat, and placed him at the
age of about thirty among the foremost at the Bar, was the great
ejectment case brought by John Jacob Astor, in regard to a tract of land
in Dutchess County, which, it has always been understood, was prepared
and managed by him, so far as arrangement of it out of court was
concerned.
See Local Intelligence: Death of Daniel Lord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1868, at 2.
   
    
     
      
      
      
    
    
 
    
    
       
    
    
    
      
    
     
      
 
        
        
        
       
     
      
        
      
     
      
      
        
   
    
     
       
           
    
     
       
 
         
    
         
1110 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
brokerage firm, the Atlantic Insurance Company, the
booksellers Berard and Mondon, the oil merchants Fish,
Grinnell & Co., the shipping agents C. & J. Barstow, the
importers and merchants F.W. Steinbrenner & Co., the
Alley, Lawrence & Trimble commission house, and the
prosperous store owners and importers A. Tappan & Co.192 
New clients continued to appear in Lord’s firm’s books
throughout the nineteenth century.
Lord’s clients valued his work in both tangible and
intangible ways. Estimated conservatively, from 1836 to
1848 clients paid him and his partner more than $7000 a
year.193 In the 1840s, when industrial workers earned less
than $0.06 an hour, this was a tremendous amount of 
money.194 Even in 1856, only five percent of New York City’s
residents owned assets over $10,000. By the early 1850s, now
part of a three-member firm, Lord took home more than
$15,000 a year, with the firm grossing at least twice that
sum.195 Lord’s clients admired his work, and they continued
192. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1831–1838) (on file with John D. Gordon III);
Kenneth J. Blume, Aymar & Co., in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE U.S.
MARITIME INDUSTRY 54 (2012); JESSICA M. LEPLER, THE MANY PANICS OF 1837:
PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE CREATION OF A TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 142– 
43 (2013); THOMAS LONGWORTH, LONGWORTH’S AMERICAN ALMANAC, NEW YORK 
REGISTER, AND CITY DIRECTORY OF THE SIXTY-FIRST YEAR OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 91, 628, 629 (1836); WILLIAM L. MACKENZIE, THE LIVES AND
OPINIONS OF BENJ’N FRANKLIN BUTLER, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 110 (Boston, Cook & Co. 1845); LEWIS TAPPAN,
THE LIFE OF ARTHUR TAPPAN 70 (1870); EDWIN WILLIAMS, THE NEW-YORK ANNUAL
REGISTER FOR THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1834: CONTAINING AN ALMANAC, CIVIL AND 
JUDICIAL LIST, WITH POLITICAL, STATISTICAL AND OTHER INFORMATION,
RESPECTING THE STATE OF NEW-YORK AND THE UNITED STATES 259 (1834).
193. I calculated these numbers using Lord’s surviving records. The success of
Lord and Butler’s partnership distinguishes it from many other firms. According
to Naomi Lamoreaux, the majority of other nineteenth-century partnerships
seem to have offered few financial benefits over sole proprietorships, and they
often failed or dissolved quickly. See Naomi Lamoreaux, The Partnership Form
of Organization: Its Popularity in Early-Nineteenth-Century Boston, in
ENTREPRENEURS: THE BOSTON BUSINESS COMMUNITY, 1700–1850, at 269, 282–83,
293 (Conrad Edick Wright & Katheryn P. Viens eds., 1997).
194. See LAWRENCE H. OFFICER, TWO CENTURIES OF COMPENSATION FOR U.S.
PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING 166 tbl.7 (2009). 
195. These calculations are based on records for 1851, 1856, 1857, and 1858.
    
   
    
 
     
      
  
    
      
    
     
     
    
     
 
   
   
 
 
   
  
    
 
      
 
        
      
     
        
 
         
 
    
     
      
      
    
     
       
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1111
to return to him year after year, despite his significant fees.
The Atlantic Insurance Company for example, for whom
Lord began working in the 1830s, regularly consulted Lord’s
firm throughout his lifetime.196 With Astor, Lord also
developed a close and long-lived relationship, working for
him the last seventeen years of Astor’s life.197 Astor’s family
members continued to turn to Lord for their own business 
ventures after their father died.198 Lord’s papers reveal many 
such repeated relationships, in which, over months and
years, he positioned himself as a trusted adviser and as 
navigator of the unstable market. Lord became “a lawyer and
a friend,” someone “to be consulted in an emergency where a
client’s whole fortune or reputation for life might depend on
the course.”199 
D.  Law and Business 
Lord’s ties with his clients were not unusual.
Businessmen recognized the importance of law to their
enterprises. A series of how-to manuals, published
throughout the nineteenth century, offered to introduce 
market participants to the rudiments of law to help them
undertake business in an economy dependent on credit and
anonymous exchange.200 As one book noted, merchants could
See Daniel Lord, Daybook (1847–1856) (on file with John D. Gordon III); Daniel
Lord, Ledger (1859–1866) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
196. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1831–1838) (on file with John D. Gordon III);
Daniel Lord, Ledger (1839–1844) (on file with John D. Gordon III); Daniel Lord,
Daybook (1857–1865) (on file with John D. Gordon III); Daniel Lord, Daybook
(1865–1868) (on file with John D. Gordon III). They may have also relied on his
firm after his death, but I did not have access to those records. 
197. John Jacob Astor first appeared in Lord’s account book in 1831. See Daniel
Lord, Ledger (1831–1838) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
198. Daniel Lord, Ledger (1847–1856) (on file with John D. Gordon III). 
199. MEMORIAL, supra note 161, at 99.
200. See, e.g., EVERY MAN’S LAWYER: OR EVERY MAN HIS OWN SCRIBENER AND
CONVEYANCER (J. Royer 1830); MOSES CROWELL, THE COUNSELLOR, OR EVERY MAN
HIS OWN LAWYER (Ithaca, D. D. & A. Spencer 1844); THE NEW AMERICAN CLERK’S 
MAGAZINE: AND YOUNG CONVEYANCER’S POCKET COMPANION (Alexandria, R. & J.
Gray 1803); FREDERIC W. SAWYER, THE MERCHANT’S AND SHIPMASTER’S GUIDE, IN
   
       
    
     
  
  
     
     
   
  
   
    
      
     
    
  
   
      
   
 
     
  
    
      
 
      
        
    
 
          
   
   
        
  
         
     
  
     
          
        
     
1112 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
not safely extend credit to “customers . . . scattered
throughout the country” unless they understood the laws in
the states in which they were trading.201 Nor could retailers
make loans to their purchasers without understanding “the 
legal details concerning false representations on the part of 
buyers.”202 The books contained forms for notes, contracts,
mortgages, and other common legal documents, as well as
basic summaries of relevant law so that businessmen could
undertake basic legal tasks themselves.203 Even these self-
help books, however, exhibited faith in the expertise of
lawyers. One, for example, prominently noted that the
author had been “assisted by an attorney” in producing his
book.204 Another recommended that a businessmen turn to a
lawyer in a matter involving “any considerable amount.”205 
The strongest testimonial to lawyers came in Edwin T.
Freedley’s, A Practical Treatise on Business. According to
Freedley, it “was positive economy for every man whose
contracts are at all complicated, in fact, whose business is not
of the simplest kind, to choose at the outset of his career an 
able attorney, which whom to consult and advise before
concluding any important undertaking.”206 Attorneys,
Freedley maintained, recognized issues that businessmen,
clouded by “anxious cupidity” might not. Their true worth
RELATION TO THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, UNDER THE EXISTING
COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston, Benjamin Loring &
Co. 1840); THE BUSINESS MAN’S ASSISTANT AND LEGAL GUIDE (New York, L. 
Hauser & Co. 1855). 
201. JOHN G. WELLS, WELLS’ EVERY MAN HIS OWN LAWYER, AND UNITED STATES
FORM BOOK 7–8 (New York, Pudney & Russell 1860).
202. Id.
203. Most also contained other general reference information, such as
instructions for keeping books or calculating interest. See generally, e.g., id.
204. I.R. Butts, Front Matter to The Trader’s Guide, and Business Man’s Legal 
Companion, in THE BUSINESS MAN’S LAW LIBRARY (New York, H. Long & Bro.
1855).
205. CROWELL, supra note 200, at 17.
206. EDWIN T. FREEDLEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BUSINESS: OR HOW TO GET,
SAVE, SPEND, GIVE, LEND, AND BEQUEATH MONEY: WITH AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
CHANCES OF SUCCESS AND CAUSES OF FAILURE IN BUSINESS 119 (1852).
    
      
    
     
       
       
    
  
      
    
  
     
   
  
     
    
   
   
  
 
       
  
 
   
   
          
 
        
       
       
     
         
  
            
      
            
  
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1113
was not in the courtroom but outside it, “to save men from
lawsuits [was] the noblest office of their profession.”207 For
those who could afford what Freedley considered a
“moderate . . . sum,” lawyers promised to ease the difficulty
of navigating a treacherous economic climate.208 As another
author concluded, if “pa[id] honorably,” a client could expect
“safe and correct advice.”209 
E.  Legal Work 
As the books recommended, Lord’s clients hired him to
work closely with them as they participated in the most 
active sectors of the New York economy: real estate, finance,
insurance, and trade. In real estate, Lord’s clients speculated
on city land, counting on the value to increase as the
population of Manhattan swelled. In finance, they loaned
and borrowed money in support of trade and business.210 As
insurers, Lord’s clients protected merchandise and real
property, earning profits from the premiums they charged.211 
In trade, they brought furs, silks, spices, and other
commodities to New York and then distributed them 
throughout the country. In each of these ventures, Lord’s 
work supported and secured their participation in the
volatile and lucrative New York market.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. BENJAMIN SWAIM, 2 THE MAN OF BUSINESS, OR, EVERY MAN’S LAW BOOK
419–20 (1834). These statements can be read in part as responses to stereotypes
disseminated about lawyers at the time. Marc Galanter relates a joke circulating
in 1832 about a lawyer who pretended to be ignorant until his prospective client
“placed a shining guinea in the learned gentleman’s hand.” MARC GALANTER,
LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE 66–67 (2005).
210. Bankers became some of the richest New Yorkers. See BECKERT, supra
note 169, at 25.
211. From January 1844 to January 1854, The Atlantic Insurance Company,
one of Lord’s largest clients generated returns of thirty-three percent and an
annual average of over $500,000 a year. See FREEMAN HUNT, 1 LIVES OF AMERICAN
MERCHANTS 419–21 (1856).
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1114 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
During the 1820s, New York’s rapid expansion
encouraged real estate speculation. For his early clients,
Lord undertook basic tasks associated with land transfers.
For example, he charged Philetus Havens $8 for “Drawing
[a] Bond & Mortgage to Bank of N York and engrossing with
collateral instrument.”212 For Gabriel Havens, Lord did more
drafting, drawing and engrossing a “[b]argain and sale of
certain lands” and a “declaration of trust relating these
deeds.”213 For other clients, Lord drew mortgages, drafted
deeds, and wrote “[p]arty wall agreement[s].”214 Deeds and
leases were the basis of the land transactions through which
New York’s business class was establishing shops and
homes, speculating on land, and developing the island.
Lord’s work formalized and secured these property
transactions. By drafting the documents on which
transactions depended, Lord reassured his clients that the
documents said what his clients wanted them to say and that
they would stand up under the scrutiny of trading partners 
and judges.
Lord’s real estate work also included the examination of
titles to property.215 This work was important, especially in
an unstable economic environment in which property might
be encumbered by multiple liens and ownership claims. A
title search involved extensive examination of the
provenance of a piece of land, detailing its exact outline and
the history of its transmission. In his searches, Lord would
have had to check for liens, unsatisfied judgments, and other
legal encumbrances that could reduce or destroy the value of
the land.216 
212. Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordon III). 
213. Id.
214. Id. (noting work done on behalf of Benjamin Birdsall).
215. Id. (“examining title” and charging $20.00).
216. See Grant Morrison, A New York City Creditor and His Upstate Debtors: 
Issac Bronson’s Moneylending, 1819–1836, 61 N.Y. HIST. 255, 267–68 (1980)
    
   
   
       
  
       
     
       
   
   
    
     
      
     
     
   
    
      
     
   
     
 
 
      
       
    
        
 
   
        
    
 
    
        
 
    
    
   
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1115
A typical entry from Lord’s records illustrates the
fastidiousness and practical reach of his title work. A deed
search in Lord’s title registry often contained a map and a
description of the lot Lord’s client intended to purchase. For
a land purchase in Brooklyn, Lord provided a map and
description of the fourteen lots his client sought to purchase 
and a history of the property’s ownership. The deed search 
begins with a transfer from October 3, 1796 and goes on for
eight pages; it includes nine separate conveyances,
culminating in the most recent in March, 1835.217 Such a
complex analysis benefited from a lawyer’s eye and his 
familiarity with property law. Lord’s examination attested to
the land’s clear title and ensured his client was making a
calculated risk on the land’s value rather than the much
larger risk of buying land with a cloudy title. Lord’s 
involvement with title work and the exchange of property
continued throughout his career.218 Lord and his partners at 
the firm continued to draw assignments and deeds,219 write
leases,220 negotiate sales,221 provide title searches for their
clients, 222 and even “attend[] the closing of sale of 
property”223 into the 1860s. They provided the legal expertise
that businessmen agreed was essential to commerce.
(describing importance of title searches). Titles were complicated before lawyers
became involved. See, e.g., David Thomas Konig, Community Custom and the
Common Law: Social Change and the Development of Land Law in Seventeenth-
Century Massachusetts, 18 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 137, 148, 163 (1974) (discussing
problems caused by uncertain titles including the reduction of land values).
217. Daniel Lord, Title Register (1796) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
218. See, e.g., Daniel Lord, Ledger (1859–1866) (on file with John D. Gordon
III) (examining title on behalf of G.H. Robbins, “drawing deed” on behalf of
William Bradford).
219. Id. (recording drawing of assignment and deed).
220. Id. (drawing trust deed and drawing “party wall agreements” and
“agreements of lease”).
221. Id. (on behalf of S.B.J. Morse).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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1116 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Lord was deeply enmeshed in financial work, work that
the volatile New York economy continually produced. Even 
large and successful New York merchants did not always
have the specie required to pay for merchandise, and they
therefore relied on private financial instruments as a means
of exchange. He drafted securities,224 filed legal protests
when debtors refused to pay,225 and secured hundreds of 
debts on behalf of lenders.226 Although Lord’s practice was 
especially note-heavy in its early years, his involvement with
finance lasted his entire career. Lord and his associates 
provided counsel in relatively straightforward debt cases
even as they also represented clients in novel commercial law
cases before appellate courts.227 That his clients continued to
hire him suggests that they valued the reassurance that
financial work by an experienced and well-regarded lawyer
provided.
Lord helped his clients deal with other risks as well. In
New York, commercial actors faced threats from weather, 
pests, and fire, and they took out insurance policies to guard
against those risks Lord’s books reflect extensive work for
both policyholders and providers. His practice on behalf of
insurance companies grew from a small concern in the 1820s
to a major focus in the 1830s and 1840s. He drafted affidavits 
that testified to the value of insured properties and goods,
and these affidavits became the basis of insurance 
224. See, e.g., Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordon
III) (“[t]o services in securing debt of Richardson” and “drawing securities with
Rich & Grant”).
225. See, e.g., id. (“protesting note” on behalf of Aiken, Fisher, and Goddard).
226. See, e.g., id. (“Services in securing debts of Richardson” on behalf of John
Penfold).
227. See, e.g., Daniel Lord, Daybook (1847–1856) (on file with John D. Gordon).
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2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1117
payouts.228 Because insurance policies were steeped in legal
language and process, clients hired Lord to interpret policies 
and to represent them in court in policy disputes.229 The work
ranged from writing opinions on the legality of the company’s 
actions to consulting on “sundry” issues related to the
insurance applications of ships.230 Lord also provided advice
respecting policy provisions and drafted insurance payout 
agreements to ensure that settlements were final.231 In his
insurance work, Lord’s expertise assured his clients that the
policies that they bought and sold actually covered (or
excluded) what they intended. Much of Lord’s insurance 
work took place out of court, and it helped his clients avoid
litigation. The Atlantic Insurance Company, for example,
was only involved in six lawsuits in the first twenty-four
years of the company’s existence.232 Relying on Lord helped
them avoid the cost, delay, and uncertainty of trial.
As demonstrated in Elisha Whittlesey’s practice, because
of limitations on transportation and communication,
businessmen in the early nineteenth century frequently
relied on agents to act on their behalf. Although some of
these agents, like Whittlesey and his colleagues on the
Western Reserve, were lawyers, others were essentially
temporary employees. For clients who relied on agents, Lord
drafted power of attorney forms, which authorized purchases
228. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordon).
229. In one of his first cases of great prominence, he argued that rats eating
bear skins fell under an insurance clause that covered “perils of the sea.”
MEMORIAL, supra note 161, at 15. 
230. Daniel Lord, Daybook, (1833–1835) (on file with John D. Gordon); Daniel
Lord, Daybook (1837–1838) (on file with John D. Gordon).
231. See Daniel Lord, Daybook (1837–1838) (on file with John D. Gordon)
(listing extensive work on behalf of the Atlantic Insurance company and charging
for writing an “award between B De Forest & Co & Ocean Ins. Company”).
232. At a dinner in honor of the founder of the firm, Lord remarked that in
twenty-four years, “not more than six lawsuits have occurred to it, and I can
recollect but four.” See HUNT, supra note 211, at 419.
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or sales of goods, stock transfers, or more general powers.
These forms were in such demand that in six months, Lord
drafted five of them for just one client, a merchant who
needed them for employees in his dry good business.233 A 
carefully drafted power of attorney form could limit an
agent’s powers and prevent him from abusing his position.
Lord also prepared sales agreements for large purchases, 
ensuring that the terms of exchange would be valid in
court.234 His contractual work further included the review 
and drafting of contracts and other agreements.235 In
addition to regulating interactions between firms, Lord
helped organize his clients’ internal affairs. Articles of co-
partnership, for example, set the rules for the division of
power and money in a business, and opinions on corporate
law helped his clients navigate internal power structures.236 
F.  Legal Culture 
Like most commercial lawyers, Lord was in a position to
take advantage of those with whom he did business. He held
greater expertise than they did in legal matters, and his
clients delegated to him significant discretion to make 
decisions on their behalf. In a complex economy they had
little choice. Their enterprises were simply too large for them
to personally oversee every transaction or carefully peruse 
every document. Unlike some of his client’s other economic
partners, however, Lord depended on repeat business. His
good reputation was critical to his ability to win favor with
his clients. Lord successfully developed—then maintained— 
this reputation during his career, winning the trust of his
major clients. Instead of keeping Lord at arm’s length,
businesses and businessmen welcomed him into their inner
233. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John D. Gordon).
234. See, e.g., id. (listing the drawing of an agreement and a bill sale, as well
as charges for “advice & services purchasing order & memorandum for silk
goods”).
235. Id. (listing $1 charge for examining agreement with J.J. Astor).
236. Id.; Daniel Lord, Daybook (1837–1838) (on file with John D. Gordon).
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circles. With the Atlantic Insurance Company, for example,
Lord’s relationship grew strong enough that he was referred
to as a “counsellor to the . . . company” and was invited to
give a speech at a celebratory affair honoring the company’s
founder and chairmen.237 Similarly, when Astor died in 1845, 
he not only provided for Lord to act as the executor of his 
estate (with a $5000 yearly allowance) but also appointed
him to oversee his charitable bequests.238 Business
relationships thus became personal, building the confidence
that Lord’s clients had in him and strengthening Lord’s 
economic ties to his clients. Sustained relationships like this
were the hallmark of other elite members of the New York 
Bar.239 
One of the reasons lawyers like Lord were able to build
these close relationships with their clients was that the legal
profession’s values made its members seem more
trustworthy. Lord and other members of the bar claimed that
they kept a critical distance from the market: “the profession 
of the law was not in and of itself the pursuit of gain,” they
declared, saying that a good lawyer like Lord worked hard
but not for his own benefit.240 Instead, he strove to harness 
and discipline market forces on behalf of clients. Lord was
singled out for special commendation by his colleagues
because he continued to practice diligently even after he
grew wealthy later in his career.241 In the mind of his fellow
237. HUNT, supra note 211, at 419.
238. Astor Will Nets $5,000 A Year as Executor, BOS. DAILY ATLAS, Apr. 1, 1848;
John Jacob Astor’s Gift, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1881. Daniel Lord was one of twelve
trustees. The others were Washington Irving (the author), William B. Astor (John
Jacob Astor’s son), James G. King (businessmen, politician, and Litchfield
graduate), Joseph G. Cogswell, Fitz-Green Halleck (the poet), Henry Brevoort
(rich New York landowner), Samuel B. Ruggles (politician and large New York
landowner), Samuel Ward (banker), Charles Astor Bristed (scholar and Astor’s 
son-in-law), the Chancellor of New York, and the Mayor of the City of New York.
Id.
239. See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
240. MEMORIAL, supra note 161, at 74–75. Lord worked, William Evarts said,
“as if work was all that there was of life that was worthy to be done.” Id. at 69. 
241. See MEMORIAL, supra note 161, at 12 (noting that Lord “did not suffer the
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lawyers, this proved that he worked not for the love of money
but out of devotion to his profession and its highest values.242
Lawyers thus presented themselves—or at least the
leaders of the profession such as Lord—as motivated by
ability and integrity more than by desire to get rich.243 Lord
apparently viewed his work the same way. For him, financial
“success was a thing of the slightest importance compared
with the administration of justice—with bringing the Court
and the Bar and every one to the administration of
justice.”244 Lord thus claimed to adhere to the values
espoused by his profession, even when they conflicted with
the acquisitiveness of the market.
Conveniently, this perspective did not discourage elite
lawyers from working for wealthy commercial clients.
Instead of shunning the world of commerce, the bar classified
its work on behalf of commercial clients as consistent with
the profession’s values. Lord’s colleagues thus praised him 
with one breath for earning the “confidence of commercial
circles on commercial questions,” and with another for his
“good service to the interests of justice and advancement of
truth.”245 Commercial work, according to the bar, was
“worthy work, for worthy ends, and by worthy means.”246 It
was so worthy, in fact, that Lord’s colleagues claimed that a
practice devoted to commercial work was just as “as useful
withdrawal of the absolute necessity for work to check the ardor with which he
continued his accustomed labor”).
242. See id. at 73–75. The irony of one of the richest lawyers in New York
praising another of the richest lawyers in New York for his modest fees appears
to have been lost on Evarts.
243. See id. at 62. Lawyers who seemed overly concerned with money were
criticized for this concern. The similarity to the way that modern lawyers function
is striking. See RILES, supra note 32, at 69 (describing lawyers as “[b]eing
intimately involved by being just a little distant” which prevents them “from
lapsing into the (slightly vulgar, in lawyers’ eyes) role of an actual market
participant”).
244. E.C. Benedict, Speech of E.C. Benedict, reprinted in Local Intelligence: 
Death of Daniel Lord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1868.
245. Id.
246. MEMORIAL, supra note 161, at 69. 
    
 
 
      
    
 
      
  
      
 
   
       
    
   
   
     
   
   
  
  
      
    
     
       
      
   
     
    





    
        
          
        
  
    
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1121
and as influential” as the work of those who “held judicial or 
official station or [were] honored by political distinctions.”247 
Working for commercial clients thus fulfilled core 
professional values in the same way as traditionally
prestigious legal callings.
It is tempting to dismiss the bar’s self-presentation as a
self-serving delusion, especially because the same lawyers 
who professed a devotion to integrity over money were
among the richest men in the city. Indeed, many of Lord’s 
contemporaries, especially those in the middle class who
could not afford to develop the close relationship with a
lawyer that Lord shared with his clients, saw lawyers as
cynical, expensive con artists, and they sought—mostly
unsuccessfully—to limit the profession’s influence.248 But the
bar’s focus on principle was too pervasive and too often
touted in private settings for it to be dismissed out-of-hand. 
Moreover, we need not assume an altruistic motive for the 
bar’s adherence to these values, as it was in the long-term
interest of lawyers to develop lucrative relationships with
commercial clients who wanted lawyers and had the means
to pay them. Although this legal culture was not as pure as
elite lawyers professed or imagined, it was nevertheless
powerful and well received by the commercial bar’s clients.
Members of the middle class were often less convinced of the
profession’s integrity, but they were not the profession’s
main patrons.249 By emphasizing values like integrity and
honesty, elite lawyers signaled businessmen that they were
reliable navigators of the risky world of economic exchange,
thereby encouraging those active in commerce to pay for— 
and trust—legal counsel. Ironically, the profession’s lofty 
ideals suited them to support economic exchange.
247. Id.
248. See generally Maxwell Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism: 
Challenge and Response in Nineteenth Century America, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
269 (1971); BLOOMFIELD, supra note 51, at 44–58. Most of these criticisms came
from middle-class Americans. Id.
249. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 51, at 42.
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G.  Effects of Legal Work 
The commercial work for businessmen that the bar’s 
culture encouraged exerted significant influence. As North 
and others have noted, by helping to enforce agreements in
courts, lawyers like Lord supported the formal constraints on
human behavior that contribute to the functioning of 
markets.250 Thus, by helping clients redeem notes in default
or sue for enforcement of contracts, lawyers encouraged their
clients to participate in trade. In complex suits, in which
precedent did not clearly dictate an outcome, lawyers helped
to set formal rules for future transactions.251 As Lord’s
account books reveal, however, he was more often an advisor
or drafter than a litigator.252 By drafting documents, a
lawyer placed these agreements within the aegis of the legal
system. Legal expertise, in other words, ensured that clients
could turn to the courts if a transaction went bad. Lord and
his colleagues thus served as liaisons between courts and
their clients, making it possible, for example, for outstanding
notes to be redeemed and property seized.
Although properly drafted documents could prove useful
in courts, most party wall agreements, mortgages, and notes
never appeared before a judge and would therefore not 
formally constrain the behavior of the parties. But a
combination of the belief in the power of law and lawyers,
and a pervasive legal culture that enforced that belief likely
served to increase the meaningfulness of these documents. 
As the self-help business and legal guides suggest,
commercial actors accepted the importance of law to
250. The formal role of lawyers as gatekeepers of the court system has been
acknowledged by North and others. See NORTH, supra note 4, at 54–59.
251. By probing, for instance, whether a term like “perils of the sea” in an
insurance policy covered damage by rats, Lord helped to set the formal
constraints for future transactions. See Aymar v. Astor, 6 Cow. 267, 267–69 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1826).
252. Even as a young lawyer, Lord offered advice to his clients—about suits,
business, and notes. See, e.g., Daniel Lord, Ledger (1815–1823) (on file with John
D. Gordon) (listing charges for “advice” and “advice related to deed”). 
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economic activity. Moreover, other historians have found
that Americans appealed to law and legal language in many
different settings.253 John Philip Reid, for example,
maintains that even on the Overland Trail, “law-
mindedness” persisted.254 No wonder then that the dozens of
editions of legal self-help and form books published across
the country targeted not only “businessmen” but also
“farmers . . . and town officers,” “young conveyancers,”
“Country Merchant[s], . . . Mechanic[s], . . . Emigrants, . . .
Landlords and Tenants, and Married Men and Women,” 
among others.255 Even critics of the profession acknowledged
that lawyers held significant power.256 Participants in the
market were primed to believe in the law’s constraining 
force.
The legal profession’s jargon therefore fell on willing
ears. In this context, legal documents were important not
only for what they said but also for their aesthetic and
symbolic properties.257 A retailer or trader might not
completely understand the purposes or legal significance of
the form he used or the contract his lawyer drafted for him,
but he could recognize it—and value it—as something
“legal.” A legal document could therefore cement a
transaction, memorializing terms of an agreement, giving it
253. See generally JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS
OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); WILLIAM J.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1996); JOHN PHILIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980). 
254. REID, supra note 253, at 10. 
255. JACOB J. MULTER, THE FARMERS’ LAW BOOK AND TOWN OFFICERS’ GUIDE
(Albany, John Munsell, Law Printer, 1851); THE NEW AMERICAN CLERK’S 
MAGAZINE, supra note 200; WELLS, supra note 201, at iii. 
256. Part of the reason that reformers wanted to change the profession was to
take away some of the power of lawyers. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 51, at 44– 
45. 
257. See RILES, supra note 32, at 52–73, 230–32 (discussing the importance of
technicality and aesthetics to legal practice in twentieth-century Japan and the
way this practice serves as a form of “private governance”). 
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an air of formality, and placing it within the shadow of the 
law. Legal jargon thus could have a kind of talismanic
quality. Advice and counsel from a lawyer held power for
similar reasons. Lawyers were legal experts and their
professed devotion to the values underlying the law likely 
could help to give a client the confidence needed to 
participate in a transaction. This may be one reason why
clients continued to employ Lord and his firm to perform 
basic legal tasks. Just as modern lawyers have been
understood to “deploy[] evocative symbols” when reporting 
on “due diligence” investigations or using standard-form 
contracts, Lord and his fellow commercial lawyers did the
same when they reported on title searches or drafted power-
of-attorney forms.258 
Because some of the benefits of legal work were 
aesthetic, confidence adhered even when that work could not
completely guard against fraud and failure. Lord and other
lawyers could not get their clients’ money when no money
existed, and even court orders were worthless if a debtor was
judgment-proof. With a well-trained lawyer on his side,
however, especially one with whom he shared a long-term
relationship, a businessmen was more likely to feel that his
commercial transactions were calculated risks rather than
gambles.259 This is likely one reason why clients continued to 
turn to experienced members of the bar, rather than cheaper, 
less established lawyers, for basic legal tasks, even at greater
expense. Thus, despite their inability to guard against all
possible harms, by providing a buffer of legal power around
transactions, Lord and his colleagues likely encouraged the
real estate, finance, insurance, and business transactions
that made their clients rich. This confidence-building work
258. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers
and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & SOC. INQ. 679,
681–82 (1996). 
259. Suchman and Cahill argue that Silicon Valley lawyers have helped their
clients to face a “complex, turbulent, and unpredictable social environment.” Id.
at 681.
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was especially important in an economy in which confidence
was in short supply. In such a context, trust was one of the 
most important services Lord and other New York lawyers 
offered their clients; this trust was often built outside the
courtroom, and clients were willing to pay good money for
it.260 
By providing formal and informal constraints on
behavior and by encouraging confidence in the market,
lawyers not only helped increase their clients’ wealth but
also strengthened American capitalism. On a formal level,
the enforcement of property law, the maintenance of clear
titles, and the clarification of legal precedent encouraged the
transactions that drove growth.261 At an informal level,
discouraging the breaking of promises by memorializing
them in legal terms likely did the same thing. The private
governance of lawyers, as market constrainers and
confidence builders, thus helped to organize a burgeoning
New York market, and in an increasingly connected national
economy, commercial activity in New York affected
Americans across the country. When the great New York fire
of 1835 caused significant damage to the warehouses and
goods of elite New York merchants, many of them Lord’s 
clients, petitions to Congress arrived from across the 
country, encouraging Congress to offer support to New York’s 
merchants.262 By strengthening elite New Yorkers’
confidence in the market, lawyers not only encouraged them 
to trade with one another, they also encouraged the 
260. Economists have also discussed the importance of confidence and trusts
in functioning markets, even if they have not fully recognized the contributions
of lawyers. See GEORGE A. AKERLOFF AND ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:
HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 11–18 (2009); NORTH, supra note 4, at 59, 138–40; Stephen
Knack, Social Capital, Growth and Poverty: A Survey of Cross-Country Evidence
16–19 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 7, 1999).
261. See NORTH, supra note 4, at 54–59. 
262. Jane Manners, ‘Storehouse of the Industry of the Nation’: The Great New
York Fire of 1835 and the Politics of Disaster Relief, Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting (June 3, 2016).
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circulation of capital and goods in the American economy,
affecting the millions of Americans who were connected to 
New York through the market. A lawyer’s presence 
encouraged the transactions that made economic growth
possible.
IV. ADAPTING TO COMMERCIAL LAW 
Lawyers embraced their commercial role and increased
their effect on the market by building institutions that
allowed them to serve the growing demands of their clients.
The first law firms, founded in the mid-nineteenth century, 
capitalized on the commercial-law tradition and adapted the 
profession to serve its commercial clientele. They helped to 
solidify the relationship between lawyers and commerce,
securing the role in commerce that large firms still hold
today.
Lord was at the forefront of institutional development.
During the nineteenth century, most lawyers practiced
alone.263 Even legal partnerships were rare: only a “handful” 
existed in New York, and just a few multi-member firms
existed in the entire country.264 Solo practices likely
proliferated because they allowed lawyers to build the one-
on-one relationships of trust that helped to build their
client’s confidence. But as the size and scope of a business 
increased, a single lawyer could not respond to the needs and
demands of his clients, especially a lawyer like Lord, whose
reputation and expertise were in such demand. The new
multi-lawyer model for practice offered benefits to
commercial lawyers and their clients, and it was adopted
widely, first in New York and then across the country.265 
263. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 232.
264. Id.; see also KERMIT L. HALL AND PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 232 (2009).
265. Lawrence Friedman calls the development of the law firm “one of the most
striking developments of the late nineteenth century.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 52,
at 489. For more on the development of the firm see generally Wayne K. Hobson,
Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm, 1870–1915, in
    
    
 
     
    
    
     
    
 
 
    
      
          
       
     
     
   
   
      
   
       
   
   
 
       
 
    
     
         
    
           
       
         
       
        
   
   
            
2016] BIRTH OF A LEGAL ECONOMY 1127
Larger firms allowed for division of work, specialization, and
the training of young lawyers.266 By delegating work, 
lawyers could represent more clients and establish client
relationships that outlasted the career of a single lawyer.
The more flexible and capacious law firm was thus better
suited to the work of commercial lawyers. Its success as an
institution tied the bar ever more closely to its business 
clients and set the tone both for the development of the New
York Bar and of the American legal profession.
A.   Lord, Day & Lord 
In 1848, Lord formed Lord, Day & Lord, with two young
lawyers: Daniel De Forest Lord and Henry Day.267 Lord, Day
& Lord was a family firm. Daniel De Forest Lord was Daniel
Lord’s son, and Henry Day joined the family by marrying
Lord’s daughter Phebe, in February 1849, less than a year
after the firm was established.268 The next partner, George
De Forest Lord, joined the firm in 1859, after graduating 
from Harvard Law School.269 He, too, was Daniel Lord’s son.
By the time Lord died in 1873, his firm also included two
grandsons, Daniel Lord, Jr. and Franklin B. Lord, as
partners.270 Most other early law firms also relied on kinship.
The Cadwalader firm, founded in New York in 1818, was full
of Strongs and Griffins.271 Cravath, another elite New York 
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 3 (Gerald W.
Gawalt ed., 1984).
266. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 489.
267. See Obituary of Henry Day, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1893. 
268. See PERSONAL RECORDS OF THE BRICK PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK, 1809–1908, at 60 (Shepherd Knapp ed., 1909). 
269. George De Forest Lord was born in 1833. He graduated second in his class
at Yale and then went to Harvard Law School. After “spending some time in
travel in Europe” he joined the firm. See Memorial of George De Forest Lord, in
THE ‘MEMORIAL BOOK’ AND MORTUARY ROLE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
NEW YORK, reprinted in THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF NEW YORK, YEARBOOK,
1889–1893, at 84 (1893).
270. Id.
271. See HENRY W. TAFT, A CENTURY AND A HALF AT THE NEW YORK BAR, BEING
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firm, was established by a father, son, and brother-in-law.272 
The same pattern was repeated outside of New York: In
Philadelphia, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius was organized by a
set of brothers, and in Houston, Baker and Botts by a father
and son.273 Kinship allowed Lord and other early legal
innovators to overcome the difficulties posed by the novel
form of organization. Keeping firm work within the family
gave lawyers better insights into the character and potential
of their partners, helping shelter a firm’s founders from the
market’s potential for fraud and encouraging the longevity of
their enterprise.274 
Just as professed devotion to values outside the market 
helped lawyers to attract clients and build trust, their elite
firms, based largely on pre-market relationships, improved
their commercial capabilities. As larger entities, firms could
undertake much more work on behalf of their clients. Lord’s 
account books show a significant increase in business, both
in the number of clients and in returns, after he formed Lord, 
Day & Lord. By the early 1850s, Lord’s firm generated more
than $30,000 a year in revenue.275 Even when work declined 
during the Civil War, Lord, Day & Lord still brought in
thousands of dollars.276 After the war, the firm grew even
THE ANNALS OF A LAW FIRM AND SKETCHES OF ITS MEMBERS 26–27, 70 (1938).
272. See ROBERT T. SWAINE, 1 THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819– 
1947, at 2 (1946).
273. See PARK B. DILKS, JR., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS: A LAW FIRM AND ITS
TIMES 1873–1993, at 1–7 (1994); KENNETH LIPARTITO & JOSEPH PRATT, BAKER AND
BOTTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HOUSTON 2–3 (1991). See also William
Bryson, The Virginia Bar 1870–1900, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 175 (Gerard W. Gawalt, ed., 1984) (finding that
“[b]efore 1870, and after, there were few partnerships of two lawyers working
together; more often than not, they would have resulted from a close family
relationship”). 
274. See Lamoreaux, supra note 193, at 285 (finding that in Boston, family
firms tended to have longer lifespans).
275. These calculations are based on records for 1851, 1856, 1857, and 1858.
See Daniel Lord, Daybook (1847–1856) (on file with John D. Gordon III); Daniel
Lord, Ledger (1859–1866) (John D. Gordon III).
276. See Daniel Lord, Ledger (1859–1866) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
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faster, cementing its place as one of the top commercial law
offices in New York. Along with this increase in volume came
an increasing ability for intra-firm specialization. At first,
the younger, less experienced lawyers performed relatively
less complex tasks like drafting documents and title
searches. Later, each lawyer developed a specialized practice 
area. Daniel Lord, for example, focused his work at the end
of his career on in-court representation. Henry Day, on the
other hand, developed an expertise as an out-of-court lawyer
and client counselor.277 This more diverse practice expanded
the firm’s capabilities in an increasingly complex commercial
law environment. A firm also offered improved efficiency,
because its lawyers worked together in one office, splitting
rent and other resources. More significantly, Lord’s firm 
shared the extensive law library that Daniel Lord
accumulated across his career and that he continued to add
to throughout his life. Lord’s account records include 
constant reference to the purchase of treatises, reporters, 
and other legal sources. In just once purchase in 1849, for
example, he spent $65.50 to buy a treatise written by Justice
Story, several editions of the English Exchequer Reports, a
volume on marine insurance law, another on common 
carriers, and several other American reporters.278 By sharing
the expenses of new acquisitions, the three lawyers could
more readily afford to acquire treatises and reporters for
their library, a cost Willard Hurst has identified as one of the
largest expenses of running a law office.279 Finally, the firm
lasted longer than a sole proprietorship or partnership could
have. As Lord gradually reduced his workload during the
1860s, he transferred power and responsibility to his
partners. The firm’s remarkable longevity (it lasted until
277. See Obituary of Henry Day, supra note 266 (noting that Day “seldom, if
ever, appear[ed] in court” but earned a “handsome income through relations that
reposed in him, implicit confidence as a manager, and trustee”). 
278. See Daniel Lord, Daybook (1847–1856) (on file with John D. Gordon III).
279. According to Hurst, the requirements for law books were extensive,
especially toward the end of the nineteenth century. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 308 (1950).
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1994) was tied to its ability to recruit new lawyers who could
continue its work.280 By the late nineteenth century, a
growing number of its clients were corporations or other
businesses that would outlast their founders, too. All of these
advantages meant that a firm, especially one grounded on 
family relationships, could transfer the reputation and trust-
building capabilities its leading lawyer developed into a
much larger enterprise. Lord’s partners did not need to go
through the same gradual evolution in practice that Lord
had—from working for family members to working for
strangers—to develop close ties to clients; instead, they built
on the ties and reputation that Lord already established.
Lord’s clients, on the other hand, could benefit from the 
confidence they received from being associated with a firm
that bore Lord’s name and reputation, without solely relying
on Lord to represent them. Being represented by Lord’s firm 
could reassure them and send a signal to their trading
partners, even if one of the firm’s less famous members 
provided counsel in some matters.
B.  Spread of the Firm 
Likely as a result of the benefits they offered, successful
firms moved to the head of the commercial bar in the second
half of the nineteenth century. Lord, Day & Lord; Shearman 
& Sterling; Cadwalader; and Cravath grew naturally from
small partnerships to the specialized and capacious legal
representatives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. Shearman expanded: from two partners, three law
clerks, a bookkeeper, and an office boy in 1873, to two
partners, nine associates, and associated support staff in 
1910.281 The Cadwalader firm also developed with the 
economy, establishing a practice with work ranging from
280. Lord, Day & Lord dissolved in 1994 following a vote by its partners. See
Jan Hoffman, Oldest Law Firm Is Courtly, Loyal and Defunct N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
1994 at 33, 40. 
281. WALTER KEESE EARLE & CHARLES COOLIDGE PARLIN, SHEARMAN AND 
STERLING, 1873–1973, at xxiii, 178 (1973).
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commercial suits to title examinations and corporate finance, 
on behalf of banks, trusts, estates, and railroads.282 Likewise,
Cravath grew dramatically. It transitioned from work on 
debt collection, real estate, wills, and trusts to patent 
litigation, corporate litigation, and wall street finance.283 The 
firm model spread among elite lawyers outside New York as
well. In Philadelphia, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius grew from a
partnership between Charles E. Morgan and Francis
Bockius in 1873 to a fifteen lawyer firm in 1920.284 In
Houston, Baker and Botts grew from a father-son
partnership in 1840, to a major corporate law firm in the late
nineteenth century.285 Like their counterparts in New York,
these firms distinguished themselves by their advanced work
that extended far beyond the boundaries of their cities.286 
However, despite their benefits, large law firms remained
relatively uncommon.287 
282. See TAFT, supra note 271, at 175–78, 191–201.
283. See SWAINE, supra note 272, at 2. Historians tend to underemphasize the
long history of the Cravath firm. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 486–87
(discussing large firms in the late nineteenth century with no mention of
Cravath). 
284. See DILKS, supra note 273 at 7, 24. 
285. See LIPARTITO & PRATT, supra note 273, at 2–3; see also Kenneth Lipartito,
What Have Lawyers Done for American Business? The Case of Baker & Botts of 
Houston, 64 BUS. HIST. R. 489 (1990).
286. See Lipartito, supra note 285, at 499 (“Unlike their peers who were still
wedded to the local economy, these regional firms gradually deemphasized land
conveyancing, debt collection, and title investigations and oriented their practices
around major corporate clients.”).
287. In 1904 just twenty-nine existed in New York. Hobson, supra note 265, at
11. Why did only a few top lawyers start firms? First, the firm’s financial
arrangements required meticulous record keeping. Lord’s books, for example,
include quarterly summaries, breakdowns of fees by client and type-of-service,
and schedules for the division of income between the firm’s partners. See Daniel
Lord, Daybook (1847–1856) (on file with John D. Gordon III); Daniel Lord, Ledger
(1859–1866) (on file with John D. Gordon III). Such detailed breakdowns were
unusual when most lawyers still mixed personal and business expenses. Second,
a firm required a significant business to sustain itself. Only the most prominent
lawyers, such as Daniel Lord, could bring in enough work to support himself and
two young attorneys. Third, a firm required substantial cooperation. Running a
firm would have been difficult if Lord, Day & Lord and other early firms could
not have relied on kinship ties.
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By founding firms, Lord and other early legal innovators 
built institutions designed to support the specialized,
commercial economy of the second half of the nineteenth
century. Their firms’ increased specialization and longer
lifespans suited them for corporate practice. Placing the
development of the firm in a long history of private practice
challenges the traditional story of the rise of the firm that
usually begins in the 1880s.288 According to this account, 
multi-member firms grew to serve the needs of business
clients who began to value “technical competence and the
skills of the negotiator and facilitator” over “the skills of
rhetoric and courtroom advocacy.”289 The new breed of
lawyer was an advisor rather than an advocate, his job was
to avoid litigation rather than to win it.290 Leading lawyers
(such as Lord and Whittlesey), however, had long been
providing advice and counsel.291 The law firm, then, grew out 
of the profession’s existing close ties to business and its
emphasis on private law. Lord, and other firm founders, built
their firms to do more effectively what he and other members 
were already doing: helping commercial clients navigate the
market. Rather than inaugurating a new form of legal
288. See, e.g., HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 264, at 232 (arguing that “it was
not until the post-Civil war era that professionalization of law practice surged.”).
289. Hobson, supra note 265, at 3.
290. See, e.g., EARLE & PARLIN supra note 281, at 27–28 (arguing that before
the rise of the large firm, “businessmen seldom saw the need of consulting their
lawyers until and unless something happened which called for legal talent to
enforce a claim or defend against one,” and that lawyers in the early nineteenth
century “aspire[d] to the glamorous career of advocacy”); HURST, supra note 279, 
at 302 (discussing “shift in emphasis from advocacy to counseling” and noting
that “[t]he years after 1870 showed a more matter-of-fact attitude, a prevailing
distaste for litigation as a costly luxury, and increasing effort to use law and
lawyers preventively”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 552; HALL & KARSTEN, supra
note 264, at 232; Gordon Morris Bakken, Industrialization and the Nineteenth-
Century California Bar, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR 
AMERICA 125, 137 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Jean M. Lynch, The Corporate
Law Firm: Organizational and Ecological Perspectives 15 (1989) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Brown university).
291. See generally Justin Simard, Legal Economy: Lawyers and the
Development of American Commerce, 1780–1860 (Aug. 25, 2016) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
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representation, firms represented the evolution of an already
established relationship between lawyers and their
clients.292 The law firm was not merely a response to a
changing business and economic environment; by serving
commercially active clients and encouraging them to
participate in the market, firms and the commercial lawyers 
that preceded them helped to create the conditions that made
this environment possible.
CONCLUSION 
By aligning themselves with commerce, lawyers secured
their profession’s future. Top law firms continue to rely on
their ties to business for much of their revenue and to look 
for ways to adapt their work to the needs of their clients.293 
There are so many lawyers in the United States today
because their nineteenth-century predecessors helped to 
build a system that demands their participation. More study
of the routine work of the legal profession is needed to
understand the full importance of the role that lawyers
292. Like Lord, Day & Lord; Shearman & Sterling; Cadwalader; and Cravath
all grew from partnerships of well-established lawyers. Shearman’s first partner
was the advocate for codification, David Dudley Field. See EARLE & PARLIN, supra
note 281, at 20; TAFT, supra note 271, at 3–7; SWAINE, supra note 272, at 2. 
293. See, e.g., John Coates, et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence
of the Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 999, 1029 (2011) (addressing literature on modern ties between firms
and commercial clients); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model
of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2076– 
104 (2010) (explaining evolving relationship between large firms and their
clients); see also David B. Wilkins, Law Firms, in 13 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 578 (2d ed. 2015)
(arguing that traditional “Cravath model” firm is under pressure in global
economy). Prescriptions for legal education are not far behind. See, e.g., Ben W.
Heinemen, Jr. et al., Lawyers as Professionals and as Citizens: Key Roles and
Responsibilities in the 21st Century, HARVARD LAW SCH. CTR. ON THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 49–62 (2014) (discussing educational preparation needed for
students at elite law schools who are “ready to practice on day one”); Neil J.
Dilloff, Born to Run: How Law Schools Can Meet Law Firm Expectations for New
Litigators, 33 REV. LITIG. 857, 866–69 (2014) (providing perspective of senior law
firm’s partner on what law schools should teach in response to changing legal
landscape). 
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played in encouraging economic growth in the United States
and the role they continue to play in governing the market.
Understanding the place of lawyers in American 
economic development is not just of scholarly concern. Today,
lawyers still adhere to the ideals espoused by the leaders of 
the nineteenth-century bar, continuing to view their work
narrowly and in terms of service to their clients.294 But this
focus on integrity, diligence, and expertise in client service
obscures the way that lawyers serve essential roles in the
maintenance of modern capitalism. Lawyers challenged by
recent changes in the market should embrace these roles to 
justify their presence in American economic life. They should
also, however, take their presence as technical caretakers of 
the economy seriously and recognize that private legal work
is its own form of governance. With roots this deep, their
economic role is unlikely to diminish soon.
294. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, r. 1.1, r. 1.3, r. 8.4 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2012).
